The River War

The Fallujah battle, which is just winding down, should be seen in the
context a wider campaign against the enemy in the Sunni triangle. To properly
understand the goals of that campaign, we should first put ourselves in the
shoes of the enemy. The Command
Post reproduces an extensive extract of a press statement by a former
Republican Guard general who now styles himself as a spokesman for the
'resistance'. Although it is probably puffed up for propaganda purposes, it
contains a degree of plausibility from which we can infer the outlines of their
strategy.

We are very satisfied indeed concerning the reality of the resistance and
its results on the terrain. The Resistance in fact has become an every day
popular state no one can ignore. We can speak about the Resistance in two
terms: First in Iraqi terms: the Resistance has spread its complete control
over a great number of Iraqi towns. What is happening in Fallujah, Samaraa,
Qaem, Baaquba, Hawijah, Tallafar, Heet, Saqlawyia, Ramadi, Anah, Rawa, Haditha,
Balad, Beiji, Bahraz, Baladruz, and other cities and towns of Iraq,
confirm perfectly this reality. The Resistance also controls totally some
areas in Baghdad and its suburbs such as Yusufya, Latifya, Abu Ghraib, and
Mahmudya, which shows the political and the security impasse encountered by
the Occupiers and their agents. Here we have to mention the widespread popular
cover the Resistance enjoys in these areas and elsewhere, rendering all Iraqi
resistance fighters in the confrontation moments with the enemy.

... After this rapid and summary lecture of the Iraqi resistance reality, I
can say that we are very confident about the future. What we planned before
the Occupation is being achieved on the terrain in a good way. This shows
the correct political and military Iraqi leadership long-term vision, when it
planned the Resistance and started its fire. There is a unified military
leadership, which leads the operations in the terrain in every town of Iraq.
This leadership includes the best officers of the Iraqi Army, the Republican
Guard, Saddam�s Fidayyins, and the Security and Intelligence services. What
is happening in the Provinces of al Anbar, Diyala, Mosul, and Salah el Din,
Babel and elsewhere is a bright sign of what I am telling you.

There are two factual nuggets in this screed. First, it gives us a map
of the the towns which the enemy considers its bastions. Second, it hints of a
fallback plan conceived before the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a
subject earlier discussed in War
Plan Orange. By plotting the enemy strongholds on the map it is at once
evident that they are coextensive with two pathways. The first goes northward
along the Euphrates from western Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, Hadithah, Anah and
Qusabayah -- along the river and road from Baghdad to the Syrian border. The
omission of Qusabayah from mention is very peculiar, since it has been the scene
of battalion sized battles between infiltrators and Marines guarding the Syrian
frontier since the earliest post-OIF days, but I include it here on that
account. The second set of towns goes northeast along the Tigris towards Tikrit
and parts of Kurdistan: Hawijah, Balad and Samarra. A spur runs off toward the
Iranian border: Baqubah and Baladruz, on the road to the Iran. It is hard not to
think that we are looking at their lines of communication.

The towns along these pathways are probably waystations where men and weapons
can be smuggled by stages, a kind of Sunni Ho Chi Minh  Trail. My own guess
is they are probably superimposed on traditional smuggling routes from Syria and
Iran which have now been converted to serve the enemy cause. I caution the
reader that this is guesswork, but I think it is correct. The discovery of
carbomb factories in Fallujah suggests that town was the easternmost terminus of
a finger that extended straight from the Syrian border, a final launching pad
where enemy delivery systems were "bombed up" for their sorties at US
targets in the city or as convoys made their way along the highways west of
Baghdad.

Taking Fallujah then, was not merely a symbolic political act to reduce a
'symbol of defiance', but a sound operational move. It interdicts the conveyor
belt of destruction that flowed from the Syrian border towards Baghdad. The
logical next step is to cut the line again near the Syrian border, perhaps at
Anah, so that by taking out both ends the middle is left unsupported.
Alternatively, the US could roll up the enemy line of communication going north
by taking out Ramadi which would force the enemy to sortie from Haditha, a
little ville a lot farther from Baghdad. Although this will not totally destroy
the insurgency, it will throttle movement along their lines of communication
considerably. Guerilla warfare, like all warfare, is logistics. It just takes
different forms.

In order to accomplish this task, the US has approximately
18 brigades -- about 50 battalions -- at hand. But many of these are
assigned to important security duties and about
10 battalions were directly employed in the Fallujah operation or in
support, and it will be some days, even weeks, before these units are available
again to mount other operations. But the Prime Minister Allawie's 60
day declaration of martial law strongly suggests that the Sunni campaign
will be finished before elections are held in January and that means there will
be very little pause in American operational tempo. In fact, although the focus
of media coverage has been on the urban battle in Fallujah, pursuit operations
up and down the ratline to Syria are probably in progress. Chester
was surprised to learn that contrary to his expectations, the British Black
Watch regiment was to the west and probably north of Fallujah, not east as he
expected. That means it was not between Fallujah and Baghdad, but between
Fallujah and Ramadi. This suggests the hammer could fall on Ramadi, with Black
Watch in a blocking position. One can only wait and see.

Every campaign has a political dimension. The campaign in the Sunni Triangle
is probably aimed at convincing the enemy that resistance is now futile and
their best hope lies in participating in the new Iraqi government through
elections. Personally (speculation alert!) I doubt it can achieve as much. The
campaign will absolutely gut the enemy as a guerilla force, but it will not be
enough to prevent them from terrorizing Sunni politicians who may wish to
participate in the coming elections. But this will only postpone unconditional
Sunni defeat for another year because a terrorist enforced boycott will mean
that Kurds and Shi'ites will dominate the new administration and most
importantly, its Army. By next year, the regular Iraqi Army will be a far more
potent force and the Sunni insurgency a far weaker one. But that's the old sad
human story; to miss the chance when it comes and pine for it ever afterward.