Successive Cities

Historically, large urban battles have always been part of a larger campaign.
Stalingrad from the German perspective was part of the general offensive whose
goal was to destroy the Soviet Union. From the Soviet point of view Stalingrad
represented a sinkhole which would empty the German 6th Army of its combat power
preparatory to its later encirclement. The Battle of Manila was largely fought
the possession of the seaport, which the Japanese wished to deny to American
logisticians.

The relatively recent Battle of Grozny also had a wider context.

Parameters noted that the Chechens saw it as part of their politico-military
strategy for wearing down Russia. Grozny was merely the first in a succession of
via Dolorosas they wanted to present the Russians.

The Chechens reverted to a battle of "successive cities" after the Grozny
battle ended, hoping to recreate their Grozny successes elsewhere. They moved
their operations base to Shali, Argun, and other city centers. They recognized
that they could accomplish two things with this tactic: they could negate
Russian advantages of firepower in the open from helicopters, fixed-wing
aircraft, and tanks, and they could blend in with the local population to
their advantage. This not only continued to make it difficult to distinguish
combatants from civilians, but it also helped the Chechens get the local
population on their side. This was usually the result when Russian forces
entered a city, destroyed property and buildings, and killed or wounded
civilians while searching for their armed opponent.

The Israeli Battle for Beirut was also part of a larger campaign named

Peace for Galilee whose goal was to destroy a mini-PLO state that had
fastened itself onto the carcass of a fragmented Lebanon.

Wikipedia summarizes the situuation then.

In 1981, armed forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
occupied large areas of southern Lebanon. Attacks against Israeli territory
increased, as the PLO's armed forces used Lebanon as a base to attack Israel
with rockets and artillery. PLO soldiers fought with Lebanese forces; in 1996,
the World Lebanese Organization, the World Maronite Union, and multiple human
rights groups concerned with the Middle East issued a public declaration
accusing the PLO of genocide in Lebanon and stating they were responsible for
the deaths of 100,000 Lebanese civilians. Due to ongoing civil war since 1975,
Lebanon had no effective central government at the time.

But from the first, the Israeli cabinet was

uncertain about how hard or fast to move. As a result, they never trapped
the elements they intended to destroy.

Suspicious of Sharon�s sincerity and concerned about possible Syrian
intervention, the cabinet decided to monitor the campaign closely, thus
leaving any military escalation subject to its approval. Begin told the
ministers that �the cabinet will meet daily and make decisions according to
the evolving situation.� ... In the five days that followed Begin�s
announcement of 8 June, Sharon did everything he could to gain approval for
tactical moves that inched the IDF to an encirclement of Beirut. The resultant
piecemeal movements aggravated the question in the IDF concerning the final
objectives of the campaign. Meanwhile, confusion started to grow in both the
cabinet and the public when military operations began to exceed the publicly
stated forty-kilometer limit.

Apparently at this juncture in the war, the IDF missed a golden opportunity
to capture west Beirut in quick order. A Western reporter inside Beirut at the
time observed how �the sheer speed and depth of the mass Israeli invasion
stunned both the Palestinians and the Syrians.� In interviews conducted after
the war, a number of Palestinians depicted the Arab forces in the city as
�demoralized, dispirited, and panic-stricken as a result of the crushing
defeat they had suffered in the previous week.� ...

In response to Sharon�s encirclement of Beirut, the Israeli cabinet changed
the objectives of Operation Peace for Galilee. Instead of placing the civilian
population of Galilee out of artillery range, Israel now demanded the
departure of all Palestinian fighters and Syrian troops from Beirut. The
Lebanese Army would enter west Beirut to accept arms from the PLO fighters,
who in turn would leave without their weapons.

Arafat rejected Israel�s demand to leave the city with his organization and
decided to bide his time. Meanwhile, Arab forces in west Beirut took advantage
of the Israeli delay in assaulting the city by frantically fortifying their
own positions. �They mined the southern approaches to the city, booby-trapped
junctions, placed explosives in buildings so that they could be blown up to
collapse on advancing forces, dug trenches, and fortified bunkers.�
Eventually, a system of strong points and barricades guarded all possible
avenues of entry into the city.

The Israelis eventually won the urban battle from a military point of view,
but were counterattacked politically. The Israeli Labor party called for an end
to the war. The Reagan Administration attempted to negotiate an omnibus
withdrawal of all parties: the Syrians, the PLO and the Israelis. America backed
its guarantee with Marine peacekeepers, of whom
220 were
killed in a suicide bombing of their barracks. (Answer the trivia question:
the most costly US urban battle in the Middle East is a) Beirut, b) Baghdad, c)
Fallujah, d) Mogadishu. Bonus question: which were UN missions?) Although Israel
withdrew nearly completely from Lebanon under the deal, the Syrians never did.

Wikipedia again:

On May 22, 2000, Israel completed its withdrawal from the south of Lebanon
in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. A 50 square kilometer
piece of disputed mountain terrain, commonly referred to as the Shebaa Farms,
remains under the control of Israel. The UN has certified Israel's pullout and
regards the Shebaa Farms as occupied Syrian territory ... During Lebanon's
civil war, Syria's troop deployment in Lebanon was legitimized by the Lebanese
Parliament in the Taif Agreement, and supported by the Arab League. Fifteen
years later, Damascus justifies its continued military presence in Lebanon by
citing the continued weakness of the LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces), Beirut's
requests, and the agreement with the Lebanese Government to implement all of
the constitutional reforms in the Taif Agreement. Contrary to Taif, the
Hezbollah militia has not been dismantled, and the LAF has not been allowed to
deploy along the border with Israel, though it was called on to do so by UN
Security Council Resolution 1391, urged by UN Resolution UN Security Council
Resolution 1496, and demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 1559.

An estimated 20,000 Syrian troops (down from 35,000) remain in position in
many areas of Lebanon, although Taif stipulations called for agreement between
the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on their redeployment by September 1992.
... Syria has been accused of turning Lebanon's Government into a puppet.
Recently, the US has begun applying pressure on Syria to end its occupation
and cease interfering with internal Lebanese matters. ...France, Germany and
Britain, along with Lebanese politicians have joined the US in denouncing
Syria's interference. On September 2nd 2004 the UN Security Council adopted UN
Security Council Resolution 1559, authored by France and the US in an uncommon
show of cooperation. Echoing the Taif Agreement the resolution "calls upon all
remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and " for the disbanding
and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias".

Although Israel "won" the Battle of Beirut and the Russians eventually ousted
the Chechens from Grozny, they achieved far less than they bargained for. These
two instances illustrate how Islamic strategists believe it is possible to lose
a battle, yet win the campaign of "successive cities" within the wider war. By
skillfully playing on the political divisions of their enemies and
"internationalizing" a conflict they may be able to politically retain
objectives that they could not defend by military means.