Short of War

Short of War

The peculiar problem facing US counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia,
according to the Congressional Research Service paper Terrorism in Southeast
Asia is that it cannot do so directly without offending regional political
sensitivities. Thus the US has been forced to work through host governments even
when the hosts are corrupt and inefficient. In the Philippines, for example, a
constitutional provision prohibiting the presence of foreign combat troops has
severely limited US ability to provide support for the Philippine military.

In consideration of the Filipino Constitution�s ban on foreign combat
troops operating inside the country, Washington and Manila negotiated special
rules of engagement ... U.S. Special Forces personnel took direction from
Filipino commanders and could use force only to defend themselves.

The main focus of counterterrorism efforts has been the Abu Sayyaf
terrorist group. But not only were US efforts to attack them directly hamstrung
by the constitutional provision, but their key military allies were declared
'off limits' by Manila for political reasons. Two of the older-line Muslim
insurgents groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), had long been the object of 'peace-making'
efforts by left leaning groups in the Philippines. These groups have since
loosely cooperated with the Abu Sayyaf and have provided them with
sanctuary by merely rebranding them as their own personnel, placing them under
the protection of the 'peace agreements'.

The U.S. focus on Abu Sayyaf is complicated by the broader Muslim issue in
the southern Philippines, including the existence of two much larger groups,
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF). Both groups have been in insurrection against the Philippine
government for much of the last 30 years. The MILF, with an estimated armed
strength of 10,000, has emerged as the larger of the two groups. Its main
political objective has been separation and independence for the Muslim region
of the southern Philippines. Evidence, including the testimonies of captured
Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, has pointed to strong links between the MILF and JI,
including the continued training of JI terrorists in MILF camps.... The MILF
has had tenuous cease-fire agreements with the Philippine government. ...
However, there continues to be evidence that the MILF provides training
facilities to JI.

Nevertheless, US trainers managed to produce a force of 16 light infantry
companies which could be deployed in an offensive capacity against the
terrorists. It is worth noting that although the Philippine Army has nearly as
many divisions as the US Army only the merest fraction of Manila's forces are
available for offensive, the great bulk being passively scattered in garrisons
and camps throughout the archipelago. In an earlier post, I had informally
estimated that the Philippine Armed Forces could field approximately one brigade
for two months without running out of ammunition, money and steam. Philippine
government 'all out-war' campaigns have historically been limited to these
parameters. In a sense, Manila must negotiate with the Muslim rebels
because it has not had a military victory option available for the last forty
years. While the Muslim insurgency was limited in scope that fact did not
matter. Now that the insurgents have been souped up by Al Qaeda they may
now pose an existential threat to Manila. The availability of 16 additional
companies and US logistical, intelligence and fire support would have been
transformative. But the capability can't be used, again due to leftist-inspired
constitutional provisions.

The United States and the Philippines have attempted to negotiate a second
phase of U.S. training and support of the AFP since late 2002. The
negotiations have experienced difficulties in determining the �rules of
engagement� for U.S. personnel and the terminology to be used in describing
Philippine-U.S. cooperation. The basic issue has been whether any facets of
the U.S. role could be considered a combat role. The two sides initially
announced that U.S. training of AFP light reaction companies would take place
in northern Luzon and again on Mindanao. The objective was to train 16 light
infantry companies by the end of 2003 for use against both Muslim insurgents
and the NPA. ...

In February 2003, Pentagon officials described a plan under which the
United States would commit 350 Special Operations Forces to Jolo to operate
with Filipino Army and Marine units down to the platoon level of 20-30 troops.
Another 400 support troops would be at Zamboanga on the Mindanao mainland.
Positioned offshore of Jolo would be a navy task force of 1,000 U.S. Marines
and 1,300 Navy personnel equipped with Cobra attack helicopters and Harrier
jets. ...

This and subsequent statements indicated that the Special Operations Forces
on Jolo would participate in AFP offensive operations against Abu Sayyaf and
that the Special Operations Forces would not be limited to using their weapons
for selfdefense. The U.S. Marines were described as a �quick reaction� force,
undoubtedly meaning that they could be sent on to Jolo to reinforce AFP units.
The Cobra helicopters and Harrier jets would give AFP commanders the option of
requesting U.S. air strikes in support of AFP operations or transporting
Filipino troops on U.S. helicopters. ...

President Arroyo and AFP commanders reportedly had agreed to the plan for a
second phase of U.S.-Philippine joint military activity in a meeting on
February 4, 2003. The announcement of the plan caused immediate controversy in
the Philippines. Filipino politicians and media organs criticized the plan as
violating the constitutional prohibition of foreign troops engaging in combat
on Philippine soil. Filipino Muslim leaders warned of a Muslim backlash on
Mindanao.

American support would provide what would be a two-brigade Philippine force
with exactly the complementary capabilities they would need: mobility,
communications, combat logistics and fire support. They could actually pursue
the enemy with greater agressiveness and confidence, in the assurance that US
firepower could extract them from any tactically disadvantageous position. But
military strategy must in this case, be subordinate to political feasibility.
Recent attacks by the Abu Sayyaf on the Philippine capital itself may
eventually start to turn the political tide as it becomes evident that the
Philippines is already flooded with foreign combat troops -- supplied by the
JI and Al Qaeda -- and that American support is actually required to
repel an invasion. But things will probably have to get worse before the
tipping point is reached.