A Little Air Cover

Some

readers have argued that French intriguing against the US in Iraq is payback
for the "abandonment" of the French Army at Dien Bien Phu by the US in 1954 when all they
expected was "some air cover".
Air
Force Magazine has an interesting article describing what the French
expected in the way of "some air cover" which makes interesting reading.
At first French believed they didn't needed any help at all: they
were confident they would whip the Viet Minh.

The French strategy was to make the 15,000-man garrison a strong point and
draw Giap�s forces into battle in the valley. Navarre ringed Dien Bien Phu
with artillery outposts bearing names such as Beatrice, Isabelle, and
Huguette. These positions were deeply buried and buttressed to withstand
artillery fire. French officers believed that, by creating interlocking fields
of fire, they could defeat an attack in much the same way that they had
successfully repelled the enemy at Na San. The Europeans were confident that,
even should Giap get a few artillery pieces into play, French counterbattery
fires would silence them.

But the French were wrong. Instead of the handful of artillery pieces they
had prepared against, General Giap moved more than 200 major caliber weapons onto the
battlefield, which he used on the first day to close the French airfield. After
that, the French garrison was doomed.

Giap soon had 50,000 combat troops at Dien Bien Phu and 300,000 soldiers
and peasants moving artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and other materiel along
the 500-mile supply lines almost with impunity. Those forces outgunned the
Dien Bien Phu garrison. The French had flown in about 60 artillery pieces of
heavy caliber (57 mm and bigger). However, Giap had in place in January 1954
more than 200 heavy artillery pieces, including the fearsome �Stalin Organs,�
Soviet-built Katyusha rocket launchers. Dien Bien Phu would never be the
stronghold the French wanted. Instead, it had become a trap.

Giap�s forces unleashed fire from 105 mm guns and other artillery on three
key northern strong points and on the main airstrip. The artillery shells
cratered the runway and destroyed aircraft on the strip. French mechanics
hastened to repair what they could and got three F8F Bearcat fighter-bombers
airborne to escape. Viet Minh gunners turned six others into scorched hulks.
The artillery outposts fell within hours. Then began a dismal trickle of
wounded survivors into Dien Bien Phu�s garrison hospital. The French plan to
create intricate fields of fire was falling apart. One who knew it was the
French artillery chief, Col. Charles Piroth, who had assured his leaders that
his guns would silence the enemy�s. On March 15, he killed himself in the
fortress, using a hand grenade.

To stave off defeat "some air support" was supplied by America from the first -- even covertly when necessary -- but it was a losing battle.

The French tried to hit back with artillery and airpower. Already in action
were some 30 US C-119 Flying Boxcars modified to drop napalm on the Viet Minh
artillery. According to Ambrose, Eisenhower believed that napalm would �burn
out a considerable area and help to reveal enemy artillery positions.� 
Most of the aircrews flying these C-119s were American employees of Civil Air
Transport (CAT), the contract airline founded by Maj. Gen. Claire Lee
Chennault, the head of the World War II �Flying Tigers.� More than a few
aircrew members included US pilots from the Military Assistance Advisory
Group, stated Simpson.

Still the French perimeter shrank. With the fortress
only a mile across, French Chief of Staff General Paul Ely flew to Washington to
plead for massive air support. The extraordinary aerial effort required to save
the French garrison was spelled out in Operation Vulture. It called for
B-29 strikes covered with a fighter CAP to protect them from Chinese Migs based just a short way north. But French need still more -- as described in the following
paragraph -- and the US military approved it.

One version of the plan, detailed in Simpson�s book, envisioned sending 60
B-29s from US bases in the region to bomb Giap�s positions. Supporting the
bombers would be as many as 150 fighters launched from US Seventh Fleet
carriers. The fighters were needed because of the proximity of Chinese
airfields to the border with Vietnam. With the experience of Korea fresh in
their minds, senior officials thought China would not hesitate to open a new
�MiG Alley� over northern Vietnam and Laos. That was not the most disquieting
aspect of Operation Vulture, however. The plan included an option to use up
to three atomic weapons on the Viet Minh positions. Radford, the top
American military officer, gave this nuclear option his backing.

What happened next is a matter of contention. The Air Force Magazine believes
that President Eisenhower overruled Radford's recommendation.

In his book Eisenhower: Soldier and President, Ambrose recounted the
situation this way: �On the morning of April 5, Dulles called Eisenhower to
inform him that the French had told [the US ambassador to Paris] that their
impression was that Operation Vulture had been agreed to and hinted that
they expected two or three atomic bombs to be used against the Viet Minh.
Eisenhower told Dulles to tell the French ... that they must have
misunderstood Radford.�

Martin Windrow argues that Eisenhower was willing to approve the use of
atomic bombs to save Dien Bien Phu, but Winston Churchill objected.

In December 1953 the French army challenged its elusive Vietnamese enemies
to a stand-up battle. French paras landed on the border between Vietnam and
Laos, astride the Communist lines of communication. The Vietnamese not only
attacked, they isolated the French force and besieged it in its jungle base.
The hunters became the hunted. As defeat loomed, the French appealed to the
USA where Vice-President Nixon and Air Force General Le May planned to drop
atomic bombs on the Vietnamese supply dumps. It fell to Winston Churchill to
block the use of atomic weapons in Vietnam: President Eisenhower would
not employ them without his consent.

Indian sources have maintained that the French, ever the gentlemen, refused
the American offer.

The French watched helplessly as the mightiest points of the base fell in
the face of assaults by bare-footed Vietnamese shock units. "Our system of
trenches ran from the high mountains down to the plains, further sealing the
fate of the base with each passing day," writes Giap. On May 7, 1954, the flag
of victory was raised over the bunker of the French commander. About 10,000
enemy troops surrendered to the triumphant Vietnamese Army. At least 2,200
French soldiers were killed during the 55 days of siege. About 11,000 French
soldiers were taken prisoner by the Vietnamese. There was an eleventh-hour
appeal from the French for U.S. intervention. The plea was rejected by the
Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. John Foster Dulles, the hawkish U.S.
Secretary of State, is said to have offered two atomic bombs to the French
government to stave of a military defeat. The French government politely
refused that offer.

The Franco-American alliance is quite robust and likely to last a long time.
The French have always been there when they needed us.