Fallujah Again

Although the US military

has refused to give a timeline for the capture of Fallujah developments
suggest they are moving at very rapid operational pace.

Hours after starting the offensive, U.S. tanks and Humvees from the 1st
Infantry Division entered the northeastern Askari neighborhood, the first
ground assault into an insurgent bastion. In the northwestern area of the
city, U.S. troops advanced slowly after dusk on the Jolan neighborhood, a
warren of alleyways where Sunni militants have dug in. Artillery, tanks and
warplanes pounded the district's northern edge, softening the defenses and
trying to set off any bombs or boobytraps planted by the militants.

Marines were visible on rooftops in Jolan. This reporter, located at
a U.S. camp near the city, saw orange explosions lighting up the district's
palm trees, minarets and dusty roofs, and a fire burning on the city's edge.
Just outside the Jolan and Askari neighborhoods, Iraqi troops deployed with
U.S. forces took over a train station after the Americans fired on it to drive
off fighters.

The Fallujah can be conceived as a

rough rectangle two miles on a side bounded by the Euphrates to the west,
the railroad track to the north, a highway to the east and an "industrial park"
and suburbs to the south. The recognized enemy stronghold is the upper northwest
corner called the

Jolan but their forces are likely to be more widespread than that. But in
two successive nights, US forces have compressed the enemy from three sides
(probably a fourth, as it is likely the US has also seized the 'industrial area'
to the southeast) and have actually penetrated the enemy stronghold of Jolan in
parts, without any published casualties apart from the two Marines who died when
their bulldozer flipped into the Euphrates.

Readers will recall the same pattern of operations in Najaf where US infantry
secured the buildings and rooftops while vehicles advanced on the streets below.
In Najaf as in Fallujah too, apparently, US forces did not advance on a single
broad front but snaked in to seize key areas, breaking up enemy defenses into
pockets which can no longer support each other. The pockets may be further
isolated by bulldozing fire lanes. The low number of casualties so far indicates
that US forces have successfully sidestepped enemy forces the way a broken field
runner dodges tackles. The
Strategic Studies Institute warns that heavy casualties may result from
assaulting "mini fortresses", but many of those redoubts may be entirely
bypassed and fields of fire cleared around them.

"The big fights, where you're going to see lots of casualties, are when
defenders create miniature fortresses," Millen said. "Your infantry gets
sucked into those things, and that's when you see casualties building up." 
U.S. forces have managed to keep casualties relatively low in previous urban
battles in Iraq. In three weeks of fighting a Shiite Muslim insurgency in the
streets and massive cemetery of Najaf this summer, seven Marines and two
soldiers were killed out of a force of about 3,000. "If you go in there well
and you go in there methodically - if you have a good plan - you're not going
to have as many casualties," Millen said.

I believe (speculation alert!) that the enemy mobile defense is nearly at an
end; that his active response has probably fallen to pieces much quicker than he
anticipated and they are probably going to concentrate their resistance into
mutually supportive strongpoints or explosive barriers fairly soon. The enemy's
remaining hope is to hit the "jackpot" by demolishing a building or blowing up a
street just as US forces occupy or overrun it. As they become squeezed into a
smaller and smaller area, the risk that US forces will run into an exploding
house or building will increase. But the rapid progress of the last two nights
may be tempting US commanders to accept the risks and snap at the enemy's heels.
Going fast may prevent the enemy from setting up their defense. One almost
certain thing is that a fearful execution is being inflicted on the enemy, and
probably worst among their officers and NCOs. Tonight's events will probably
indicate whether the US goes for broke or takes a more deliberate approach.

Update

The

Daily Telegraph has an atmospheric article which describes the terrible
effect of networked forces on the enemy inside Fallujah.

"I got myself a real juicy target," shouted Sgt James Anyett, peering
through the thermal sight of a Long Range Acquisition System (LRAS) mounted on
one of Phantom's Humvees. "Prepare to copy that 89089226. Direction 202
degrees. Range 950 metres. I got five motherf****** in a building with
weapons." A dozen loud booms rattle the sky and smoke rose as mortars rained
down on the co-ordinates the sergeant had given. "Yeah," he yelled. "Battle
Damage Assessment - nothing. Building's gone. I got my kills, I'm coming down.
I just love my job."

... The insurgents, not understanding the capabilities of the LRAS, crept
along rooftops and poked their heads out of windows. Even when they were more
than a mile away, the soldiers of Phantom Troop had their eyes on them. Lt
Jack Farley, a US Marines officer, sauntered over to compare notes with the
Phantoms. "You guys get to do all the fun stuff," he said. "It's like a video
game. We've taken small arms fire here all day. It just sounds like popcorn
going off."

This engagement is all the more chilling because it probably happened at
night. Five enemy soldiers died simply because they could not comprehend how
destruction could flow from an observer a mile away networked to mortars that
could fire for effect without ranging. All over Fallujah virtual teams of
snipers and fire-control observers are jockeying for lines of sight to deal
death to the enemy. For many jihadis that one peek over a sill could be
their last.

"Everybody's curious," grinned Sgt Anyett as he waited for a sniper with a
Russian-made Dragonov to show his face one last, fatal time. A bullet zinged
by. ...

His officers said that the plan to invade Fallujah involved months of
detailed planning and elaborate "feints" designed to draw the insurgents out
into the open and fool them into thinking the offensive would come from
another side of the city.  "They're probably thinking that we'll come in
from the east," said Capt Natalie Friel, an intelligence officer with task
force, before the battle. But the actual plan involves penetrating the city
from the north and sweeping south. "I don't think they know what's coming.
They have no idea of the magnitude," she said. "But their defences are pretty
circular. They're prepared for any kind of direction. They've got strong
points on all four corners of the city." The aim was to push the insurgents
south, killing as many as possible, before swinging west. They would then be
driven into the Euphrates.

From UAVs wheeling overhead to Marines going through alleys linked by their
intra-squad radios (a kind of headset and boom-mike operated comm device), the
US force is generating lethal, real-time information which is almost immediately
transformed into strike action. Against this, the jihadis have no chance.
This doesn't mean (as I pointed out above) that there will be no American
losses. The battlefield is too lethal to hope for that. But it does mean that
terrorism has unleashed a terrible engine upon itself. Capabilities which didn't
exist on September 11 have now been deployed in combat. It isn't that American
forces have become inconceivably lethal that is scary; it is that the process
has just started.

Update 2

An

NYT article with an accompanying photo essay illustrates the high level of
skill which some of the enemy display. It's not that the enemy is dumb,
just that the US is that much better. A sequence of photos shows US troops
observing targets from a rooftop to call in fires. Right after the Americans
scoot off, enemy mortars land on the roof, too late to hurt their tormentors. It
is a perfect illustration of the lethality of information and essentially futile
enemy attempts to negate it. As the battle progresses, enemy snipers, mortarmen
and machinegunners -- who are desperately trying to deny Americans their lethal
targeting information -- will be picked off or run low on ammunition. The
combat, already lopsided to start with, will grow more unequal. If it sounds
unfair, it meant to be.

The

Strategy Page points out that the enemy has dug tunnels under streets,
utilized overhead cover and knocked holes in walls in an attempt to negate the
US information warfare advantage. But the price for living like moles is
relative immobility in trading concealment for stasis. The battle for Fallujah
illustrates the relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides. The enemy,
whatever his faults, is not obviously short on courage or resourcefulness and
America can expect to encounter the same tenacity anywhere he is met. But
against these strengths, enemy inherited not only the weakness of a poor
technological base but a fundamentally flawed concept of American determination.
They wrongly assumed, as Osama often claimed, that Americans were too morally
weak to fight. They believed they could use physical remoteness and terrorist
tactics to wage "asymmetrical warfare" on an American force geared to fight
conventional battles -- the army of Desert Storm. Both these assumptions have
proved poor bets. There are now tens of thousands of Americans with a good
understanding of the Middle East; there are many systems now coming online which
are designed to fight the terrorist enemy. They are going to get snowed under by
the same tidal wave that buried the Imperial Japanese Army and the Wehrmacht in
World War 2.

Thinking Muslim and Arab leaders probably recognize the handwriting on the
wall, but like the peace factions in wartime Germany and Japan, are still
reluctant to step forward. This is tragic, because like the unequal struggle in
Fallujah, once the US gains the strategic upper hand its advantages will
progressively mount and a hideous, irresistible annihilation of enemy forces
will unfold, until despair brings an enemy statesman forward; not too late for
his society, but too tardy to save the wasted lives of their young men.