Minggu, 06 Februari 2005

Deanism

David Brooks has a great opinion piece entitled
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/05/opinion/5brooks.html?th">
A Short History of Deanism
which describes the same process that
Simon
Rosenberg
,
a one time-contender for DNC chair, fervently advocated. That would be the
gradual takeover of the Democratic Party by its radical wing through a process
of creeping elitism. Here's David Brooks:



Since the 1960's there has been a breakdown in the machinery that allowed
Americans to work together across class and other divisions. The educated
class has come to dominate, and the issues of interest to that class
overshadow issues of interest to the less educated and less well off. But the
two major parties were affected unequally. The Republican coalition still
contains some cross-class associations, like the N.R.A. and the evangelical
churches, which connect corporate elites to the middle classes. The
Democratic
coalition has fewer organizations like that. Its elite - the urban and
university-town elite - has less contact with the less educated. ...


Howard Dean, in his fervent antiwar phase, mobilized new networks of small
donors, and these donors have quickly become the money base of the party.
Whereas Al Gore raised only about $50 million from individuals in 2000, John
Kerry raised $225 million, including $87 million over the Internet
alone. Many
of these new donors are highly educated. The biggest groups of donors to the
Dean and Kerry campaigns were employees of the University of California,
Harvard, Stanford, Time Warner, Microsoft and so on. ...


They tend to be to the left of the country, especially on social and
security issues. They may not agree with Michael Moore on
everything, but many
enjoyed "Fahrenheit 9/11." Perhaps they are among the
hundreds of thousands of
daily visitors to Daily Kos and other blogs that savage Democrats who violate
party orthodoxy. Many Republicans are mystified as to why the Democrats,
having lost another election, are about to name Howard Dean as party chairman
and have allowed Barbara Boxer and Ted Kennedy to emerge unchallenged as the
loudest foreign policy voices.


The answer, as Mickey Kaus observes in Slate, is that the party is
following the money.



If David Brooks observed the trend, Simon Rosenberg worked to make it real.
In a New York Times article entitled
href="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/25/magazine/25DEMOCRATS.html?ex=1248494400&en=13ada638bbe542f0&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt">
"Wiring the Vast Right Wing Conspiracy"
on
Rosenberg's site, a vision
of new Democratic Party is presented which not so coincidentally resembles what
Brooks was describing. Written before the November US Presidential
elections, it
described efforts by Democratic Party activists to create a counter-version of
the Great Right Wing Conspiracy.




In March of this year, Rappaport convened a meeting of wealthy
Democrats at
a Silicon Valley hotel so that they, too, could see Stein's presentation.
Similar gatherings were already under way in Washington and New York, where
the meetings included two of the most generous billionaires in the Democratic
universe -- the financier George Soros and Peter Lewis, an Ohio insurance
tycoon -- as well as Soros's son and Lewis's son. ... The plan is to gather
investors from each city -- perhaps in one big meeting early next year -- and
create a kind of venture-capital pipeline that would funnel money into a new
political movement, working independently of the existing Democratic
establishment. ...


Into this vacuum rushes money -- and already it is creating an
entirely new
kind of independent force in American politics. Led by Soros and Lewis,
Democratic donors will, by November, have contributed as much as $150 million
to a handful of outside groups -- America Coming Together,
the Media
Fund
, MoveOn.org -- that are going online, door to door and on the
airways in an effort to defeat Bush. These groups aren't loyal to any one
candidate, and they don't plan to disband after the election; instead, they
expect to yield immense influence over the party's future, at the very moment
when the power of some traditional Democratic interest groups, like the once
mighty manufacturing unions, is clearly on the wane. ...



The electoral defeat of John Kerry probably accelerated rather than retarded
the process. He was proof, or so it could be said, that Democratic centrist
politics was no longer competitive. With Kerry out on first, it was
natural that
the Deans should step up to the plate, whatever their RBI. The loss of the blue
collar wing of the Democratic Party, regarded by Brooks as a political
liability, was viewed as lightening ship by the New Democrats; a slimming down
to make them both harder-hitting and more agile. One thing that Brooks fails to
discuss is why Deanism should necessarily be confined to American borders. Its
natural constituency is the cosmopolitan elite for whom a passport is a fashion
accessory. Recently, the Guardian led a campaign by

European celebrities
to tell voters that they should elect John Kerry. When
they did not, one
href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=227010">
European newspaper
asked "How can 59,054,087 people be so
DUMB?" 
Deanism knows no bounds.


Brooks notes that 'eliti-zation' has affected both political parties because
its roots lie in the breakdown of community life over the decades, the
difference being a matter of degree. As he so eloquently put it:



As you may recall, Ralph Kramden was a member of the Raccoon Lodge in
"The Honeymooners."
... But as Prof. Theda Skocpol of
Harvard has
demonstrated, these fraternal associations lost members in the 1960's.
Instead, groups like NOW, Naral and the Heritage Foundation emerged as the
important associations in American life.



Important yes; but fraternal, no.



Update


A reader writes to say that although Dean may be a disaster for the
Democrats, the process of which he is a part is likely to make the party
healthier in the long run.



Almost every human endeavor that I am aware of holds to a few truths:



  • Open and honest debate leads to �truth� with greater certainty than any
    closed-room politics.

  • Trial and error leads to knowledge and experience.

  • Decentralized power and decisionmaking is more efficient, in the long
    term, than any centralized system.


The Dems are possibly, right now, experiencing the "pain before the gain."
A Dean chair might well be a disaster, but fundamentally, this does not
matter. The process has changed. The process has gone from political bargains
to the scientific method. Truth will be revealed. Errors will be corrected.



That might well prove to be true, although it doesn't address the
observations of Brooks. But then, who knows? The nice thing about history is
that it happens eventually.

Bargain Basement Fascism

Austin Bay
links to an opinion
piece
written by Paul Campos, a professor of law at the University of
Colorado, describing his fellow faculty member Ward Churchill as "a
pathetic buffoon" peddling a fascist ideology. The most interesting part of
Professor Campos' article lies in his description of fascism, all the elements
of which, he argues, are present in Churchill's work.



As a political inclination and an aesthetic style, fascism is marked by,
among other things, the following characteristics:




  • The worship of violence as a purifying social force.

  • A hyper-nationalistic ideology, that casts history into a drama featuring
    an inevitably violent struggle between Good and Evil, and that obsesses on
    questions of racial and ethnic identity.

  • The dehumanization and scapegoating of opponents ... demands that the evil
    in our midst be eradicated "by any means necessary," up to and
    including the mass extermination of entire nations and peoples.

  • The treatment of moral responsibility as a fundamentally collective
    matter.


Campos argues that these propositions would probably have been intolerable if
uttered by a white man but were possibly countenanced because they emanated from
an oppressed Native American who may happen to be -- oops -- a white man. But
despite its potential for comedy, Professor Campos finds nothing funny in the
matter. He asks how such a ridiculous situation could have arisen in the first
place.



The question of whether a serious research university ought to hire someone
like Churchill is laughable on its face. What's not so funny is the question
of exactly how someone like him got hired in the first place, and then tenured
and named the head of a department.


That, in the end, is a more important question than what will or ought to
happen to Churchill now. Churchill is a pathetic buffoon, but the University
of Colorado is far from alone in having allowed itself to toss intellectual
integrity and human decency overboard in the pursuit of worthy goals. ...


That through whatever combination of negligence, cowardice and complicity
we have allowed Ward Churchill to besmirch those ideals by invoking them in
the defense of his contemptible rantings is now our burden and our shame.



While the University of Colorado is casting the Churchill controversy as a freedom
of speech issue
(that's simplifying it a little. See Eugene
Volokh
for a real lawyer's take) some thought ought to be given to
University's obligation to provide a reasonable standard of instruction to
students. Students attend a university to receive a sound education and a credential.
There is an implicit contract between the student and university that a
reasonable education will be provided in exchange for the time, effort and money
spent studying. It is hard to see how the University's end of the bargain will
be kept if it allows it students to be instructed in ethnic studies by a fake
Indian teaching fascism. One might be forgiven for wondering whether the
students aren't being shortchanged.

Sabtu, 05 Februari 2005

Cole Versus Goldberg

Glenn
Reynolds
points out that Jonah Goldberg and Juan Cole are exchanging barbed
comments. target="_blank">Cole
has asserted that Goldberg is a no-nothing.



Jonah Goldberg knows absolutely nothing about Iraq. I wonder if
he has even ever read a single book on Iraq, much less written one. He
knows no Arabic. He has never lived in an Arab country. He can't read
Iraqi newspapers or those of Iraq's neighbors. He knows nothing
whatsoever about Shiite Islam, the branch of the religion to which a
majority of Iraqis adheres. Why should we pretend that Jonah
Goldberg's opinion on the significance and nature of the elections in
Iraq last Sunday matters?



target="_blank">Goldberg
retorts that Cole doesn't know how to read.



I don't think I made the allegation that Saddam had nuclear
weapons "over and over again" on CNN or anywhere else. My point was
actually the reverse. Iraq didn't have nuclear weapons and therefore
we could remove Saddam at comparatively low risk -- an option we
didn't, and don't, have with North Korea. Also, I wrote columns more
than once criticizing the effort to boil the whole thing down to the
WMDs issue.



Of course, the validity of arguments from authority have been questioned. If
predictive performance is the criterion against which to judge the
thinking of Goldberg versus Cole, it is not clear that Cole is
Goldberg's superior. For
example, Cole href="http://www.reuters.co.uk/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=655051&section=news&src=rss/uk/worldNews"
target="_blank">recently
predicted that the Iraqi elections would be a joke:



"These elections are a joke," said Juan Cole, a professor of
modern Middle East history at the University of Michigan. "The Bush
administration has created the worst possible advertisement for
democracy because the perception across the Middle East is that
democracy means you get a country where everything is out of control,"
he said.



In an ideal world the intellectual dispute between Cole and Goldberg would
simply be settled by events. However,  href="http://www.juancole.com/2005/02/wolcott-on-goldbergs-language.html"
target="_blank">Cole
has taken things to the next level by asserting that Jonah Goldberg is a
physical coward for not volunteering for combat despite the fact that he is
'pro-war'.



Goldberg helped send nearly 1500 brave Americans to their deaths
and helped maim over 10,000, not to mention all the innocent Iraqi
civilians he helped get killed. He helped dragoon 140,000 US troops in
Iraq. And he does not have the courage of his convictions. His excuse
is that he couldn't afford to take the pay cut!


What is Goldberg going to say to the tens of thousands of
reservists he helped send to Iraq, who are losing their mortgages and
small businesses and have been kidnapped for 18 months at a time (not
what they thought they were signing up for) by Rumsfeld? "Well guys,
thanks for carrying out the policy I wanted to see, and for putting
your own little girls into penury. I'd have loved to help out, but my
little girl is more important than yours and besides, I like a good
meal and I hear you only get
MREs."



Cole's assertion is not, strictly speaking, any kind of advance on his
previous argument from authority, unless it is to broaden the definition of
'authority' to include a 'moral authority' with which he feels better supplied.
But Cole's white feather is really a period; the punctuation mark the British
call a 'full stop'. As in 'from this point the conversation can go no further:
full stop'.


In truth, the ground for civilized debate has been shrinking progressively
from September 11. The sharp animosity that has sprung up between the Left and
Conservatives may be a kind of href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergent_behaviour"
target="_blank">emergent
behavior arising from the wide-ranging changes that have taken place since
that fateful day. One could hardly expect that the end of the Cold War, the
decline of Europe, the ascendancy of India and China, the collapse of the UN and
the advent of terrorism would leave political relations between Left and Right
unchanged. But it was the declining vigor of Marxist thought coupled with new
conservative ideas that poured the most fuel on the flames. Discourse between
Left and Right could only remain civil for so long as Conservatives remained
meek or had no counter-pulpit. The weakening of the traditional media and the
stresses caused by war have created a kind of 'play' in the system which now
allow unchained weights to crash about. In that sense, there is nothing
surprising about Juan Cole calling Jonah Goldberg names. One gets the feeling he
has been calling people names all his professional life; and I think Mr.
Goldberg can handle it. What has changed is that, with the decline of the MSM,
there is nothing which prevents incivility from becoming a two-way street. And
I'm not sure either the Left or the total system can contain the stress.


Jumat, 04 Februari 2005

The Ward Churchill Story 2

Reader target="_blank">Willow
at target="_blank">Legendgames
(hat tip: target="_blank">Glenn
Reynolds
) links to this href="http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2005/49.html"
target="_blank">press
release by Colorado University Phil DiStefano laying out the procedure under
which the Ward Churchill controversy will be resolved. DiStefano has crafted the
question as a strict freedom of speech issue.



Two primary questions will be examined in this review: (1) Does
Professor Churchill's conduct, including his speech, provide any
grounds for dismissal for cause, as described in the Regents' Laws?
And (2) if so, is this conduct or speech protected by the First
Amendment against University action?


As Chancellor, I will personally conduct this review and will ask
two distinguished deans, Arts and Sciences Dean Todd Gleeson and Law
Dean David Getches, to assist me with this process.



Under these terms of reference the matter of Churchill's Indian ethnicity or
the validity of his qualifications is irrelevant. He might be a creature from
outer space without affecting the outcome one whit. It is not one of the
questions the distinguished panel will resolve. Within these narrow limits the
panel will probably have no choice but to find that although Ward Churchill's
statements are ill-informed or regrettable, they are protected expressions.


Nothing of course, precludes a supplementary review of whether his
qualifications were faked. It is possible that CU will follow the strategy of
affirming the principle of academic freedom while asserting its right to dismiss
on other grounds. Yet that is contingent; the actual is that the Ward Churchill
case is being molded as a First Amendment issue, and under those terms, he is
likely to be vindicated.


But whether it will vindicate the First Amendment in general on campus and
not just Ward Churchill in particular is probably the larger question.
Consistency requires that if Churchill's speech is licit, so might many other
types of expression which have been proscribed as 'hate speech'. The
target="_blank">Seattle
PI
reports that Marquette University has banned Republican Students from
raising money for their 'Adopt a Sniper' program.



Marquette University in Wisconsin has blocked an attempt by
Republican students to raise money for a group called "Adopt a Sniper"
that raises money for U.S. sharp-shooters in Iraq and Afghanistan.
... The brainchild of a Texas police SWAT officer, Adopt a Sniper
has raised thousands of dollars in cash and gear to supplement the kit
of sharp shooters in U.S. combat platoons.



Two primary questions should be put to Marquette in this regard. '(1) Does
the student's conduct, including their campaign, provide any grounds for
proscription, as described in the Regents' Laws? And (2) if so, is
this conduct or speech protected by the First Amendment against
University action?'


The Ward Churchill Story

Gerard Van der Leun at href="http://americandigest.org/mt-archives/005070.php"
target="_blank">American
Digest
has an extended investigative post on Ward Churchill, the
professor of ethnic studies who made controversial remarks characterizing those
who died in the 9/11 attack as 'little Eichmanns'. Those statements, while
outrageous to some, were probably widely shared in the circles he frequented.
For example, the href="http://www.web.net/~boilingfrog/catalogue.html">Boiling
Frog Catalogue
sells a VHS tape called US Off the Planet whose
contents are described as:



An inspiring meeting of revolutionary minds. Ward Churchill and Chellis
Glendenning came together for the first time in Eugene OR on June 17th, 2001
where they shared their insights during a celebration of two local anarchist
rebellions. US Off the Planet presents a radical discussion of
colonialism, imperialism, genocide and resistance, underscoring the confluence
of interests between revolutionists who are struggling for a bio-centric
future, and indigenous people struggling to preserve their cultures,
histories, and way of life.



The tape, priced at $20, must have appealed to some sort of audience. And
there is probably a market for href="http://www.satyamag.com/apr04/churchill.html"
target="_blank">Satyamag,
where readers could read the writings of someone described as "one of the
most provocative thinkers around. A Creek and enrolled Keetoowah Band Cherokee,
Churchill is a longtime Native rights activist. He has been heavily involved in
the American Indian Movement and the Leonard Peltier Defense Committee. He is
Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of Colorado and has served as a
delegate to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations."


The book publisher target="_blank">AK Press
which describes itself as a "distributor organized around anarchist
principles" thought highly enough of Ward to publish On the Justice of
Roosting Chickens: Reflections on the Consequences of U.S. Imperial Arrogance
and Criminality
, in which the 'little Eichmanns' remark appears.


Churchill got around internationally; for example, he spoke at href="http://www.firstnationsdrum.com/Spring%202004/EduChurchill.htm"
target="_blank">London's
University of Western Ontario, where recalling his days "as a member of
the American Indian Movement (AIM) security team at the Pine Ridge Reservation,
South Dakota in the early 1970's, " he shared his war stories. "I
speak with a harsh voice," he said, "but I speak in truth." He
went to conferences as far as href="http://www.world-foundation.nu/bokenfoton.htm"
target="_blank">Norway
representing himself as a Cherokee, one among many oppressed minorities in
attendance, most of whom could pass for Norwegian. American Digest calls
into question at least the American Indian Movement part of Churchill's history.
Mr. Van der Leun quotes documents available the href="http://www.aimovement.org/csi/">AIM
Council on Security and Intelligence
web page explicitly denouncing
Churchill as a fake and poseur.


But in a week which featured the State of the Nation Address, the release of
the Volcker report and news that action figure Cody was held hostage by
terrorists, the attention lavished on a relatively obscure academic recalls the
inordinate power of the Scott Peterson and Michael Jackson cases to put more
newsworthy subjects into the shade. The fascination may not be with Ward
Churchill himself but with the Leftist demimonde glimpsed briefly through him.
Churchill, Peterson and Jackson are, besides being themselves, gateways into
worlds in which the incomprehensible is merely ordinary. It is not that the
worlds of the radical Left, the scumbag and high-class pervert are the same;
they are different in every particular and yet are somehow identical in a
elusive way. The common description I came near to supplying is 'fantasy',
though it is not quite that; because deep down those worlds concern themselves
with practical gratification. I think the right term is 'sad'; reprehensible yes; disgusting yes; and sad.


Kamis, 03 Februari 2005

Long Ago


It was either my poor luck or good fortune to have read AEW
Mason's
href="http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authors/M/MasonAEW/prose/f
ourfeathers/">

The Four Feathers
before coming across Winston Churchill's
href="http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num=494
3">

The River War
,  an account Britain's 19th century campaign against
an Islamic army. The British force was advancing against the
Khalifa's forces at Omdurman on September 2, 1898, bent on settling
accounts with
the theocratic heir of the
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahommed_Ahmed">Mahdi,
an Islamic preacher who some years before had led a campaign to purify Egypt and the Sudan
from
the Ottoman rulers in Cairo. Because of the British preoccupation with
maintaining the security of the Suez Canal, which was its link to India, the
Madhi's jihad eventually
brought him
into conflict Britain. Yet Kitchener
would not have been marching on Omdurman were it not for the
obduracy of another religious warrior, href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_George_Gordon">Charles George Gordon, whose private obsession with ending slavery
in the
Sudan had first 'raised the Arab street' and then led him to exceed London's instructions to evacuate the
Ottoman
garrisons surrounded by the Mahdi.



Soon after he arrived he started to end the slave
trade,
which at that point was majority of the economy. Before his arrival
some 7 out
of 8 negros in the Sudan were enslaved by the tiny minority of Arabs,
well
over 80% of the overall population. Gordon's policies were effective,
but the
effects on the economy were disastrous, and soon the population saw
this not a
liberation from slavery, but a modern-day European Christian crusade.
It was
this anger that fed the Ansar's ranks.


... His
policies were soon abandoned by the new governors ... and given their lack of interest in
the area
the British decided to abandon it in December 1883, ordering Gordon to
return
to Khartoum and organize a withdrawal. ... He found that the routes
northward were too dangerous to extricate the garrisons, and so
pressed for
reinforcements to be sent from Cairo to help with the withdrawal. He
also
suggested that his old enemy Zubayr, a fine military commander, be
given tacit
control of the Sudan in order to provide a counter to the Ansar.
London
rejected both proposals, and so Gordon prepared for a fight.



And fight Gordon did, with a zeal that rivaled that of his foes. Public
opinion eventually shamed the British government into dispatching a relief to
Khartoum, only to arrive two days late. Gordon's head was exhibited on a pike;
the Madhi died not long afterward of typhus but not before choosing his
successor, the Khalifa. Britain's interest in Egypt grew and began them on the
long road to Omdurman.



Mason's
href="http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authors/M/MasonAEW/prose/f
ourfeathers/">

The Four Feathers
contains nothing of military historical value, being
fiction; but the tale, set against the backdrop of the doomed Sudanese reliefs
of the mid-1880s, has preserved a portrait of British society at the last moment
when its tribal values were intact; when concepts like honor, faith and
patriotism were everyday things implicitly understood. The plotline is simple. A
scion of an old
military
family learns in advance of his regiment's deployment to the Sudan
and understands the savagery of the foe makes it unlikely he will survive. He
therefore uses his engagement to an aristocratic lady as an excuse to resign his commission.
He is accused of cowardice by his three best friends -- brother officers -- in
the form of three white feathers. Then a fourth is added by
his
betrothed who learns he had used their engagement as a pretext for his
desertion. The inner tensions of the Four Feathers arise from the
characters attempts to reconcile their desires for survival and love with the
requirements of duty, friendship and the commandments of their God.


The young Churchill of href="http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num=494
3">The River War
was alternately fascinated and repelled by
the fanatical enemy he prepared to meet. Yet his empathy never tempted him to
the other side. Nationality meant more than a passport in those days. For the
picture of operations against the Khalifa we must turn to The River War;
but for a portrait of the Britons who fought him, we must turn to the Four
Feathers
. From that vantage, Churchill naturally saw Islam in the context of
a clash of civilizations. Describing the situation in the Sudan, Churchill
wrote:



During the second century of the Mohammedan era, when the inhabitants of
Arabia went forth to conquer the world, one adventurous army struck south. ...
But all, without exception, were hunters of men. To the great slave-market at
Jedda a continual stream of negro captives has flowed for hundreds of years.
... Thus the situation in the Soudan for several centuries may be summed up as
follows: The dominant race of Arab invaders was unceasingly spreading its
blood, religion, customs, and language among the black aboriginal population,
and at the same time it harried and enslaved them.



Yet that cool appraisal would not blind him to the accomplishment and courage
of his foes: he would summarize the Madhi's impact on the Sudan as follows:



But I know not how a genuine may be distinguished from a spurious Prophet,
except by the measure of his success. The triumphs of the Mahdi were in his
lifetime far greater than those of the founder of the Mohammedan faith; and
the chief difference between orthodox Mohammedanism and Mahdism was that the
original impulse was opposed only by decaying systems of government and
society and the recent movement came in contact with civilisation and the
machinery of science. Recognising this, I do not share the popular opinion,
and I believe that if in future years prosperity should come to the peoples of
the Upper Nile, and learning and happiness follow in its train, then the first
Arab historian who shall investigate the early annals of that new nation will
not forget, foremost among the heroes of his race, to write the name of
Mohammed Ahmed.



That duality of view permeated the young Churchill's entire account. He was a
man it is true; but a Briton foremost. As the British expedition closed on
Omdurman, the 24 year old junior officer of Lancers saw the foe march gamely out
and dreaded the slaughter he knew would follow.



The emblems of the more famous Emirs were easily distinguishable. ... All the pride and might of the Dervish
Empire were massed on this last great day of its existence. Riflemen who had helped to destroy Hicks, spearmen who had charged at Abu 
Klea, Emirs who saw the sack of Gondar, Baggara fresh from raiding the Shillooks,
warriors who had besieged Khartoum--all marched, inspired by the memories of former triumphs and embittered by the knowledge of late defeats,
to chastise the impudent and accursed invaders. ...


The 'White Flags' were nearly over the crest. In another minute they would
become visible to the batteries. Did they realise what would come to meet them?
They were in a dense mass ... The ranges were known. It was a matter of
machinery. ... In a few seconds swift destruction would rush on these brave men.
They topped the crest and drew out into full view of the whole army.



First shells, then Maxims and finally a torrent of bolt-action rifle fire
disintegrated the Khalifa's army. As the broken Dervish remnants retreated
towards their capital, the 21st Lancers, with the future Prime Minister of
Britain attached, came sweeping for stragglers. A small cluster of Dervishes
turned and engaged the Lancers with rifle fire. It was a trap.



The pace was fast and the distance short. Yet, before it was half covered,
the whole aspect of the affair changed. A deep crease in the ground--a dry
watercourse, a khor--appeared where all had seemed smooth, level plain; and from
it there sprang, with the suddenness of a pantomime effect and a high-pitched
yell, a dense white mass of men nearly as long as our front and about twelve
deep. ... The Lancers acknowledged the apparition only by an increase of pace.
... 



The Dervish line was broken by the impetus of the charge but Winston himself
survived at long odds. "Riderless horses galloped across the plain. Men,
clinging to their saddles, lurched helplessly about, covered with blood from
perhaps a dozen wounds. Horses, streaming from tremendous gashes, limped and
staggered with their riders. In 120 seconds five officers, 65 men, and 119
horses out of fewer than 400 had been killed or wounded." Later he would
revisit the battlefield; and the young man, already a master of the English
language would write:



I have tried to gild war, and to solace myself for the loss of dear and
gallant friends, with the thought that a soldier�s death for a cause that he
believes in will count for much, whatever may be beyond this world. When the
soldier of a civilised Power is killed in action, his limbs are composed and

his body is borne by friendly arms reverently to the grave. The wail of the
fifes, the roll of the drums, the triumphant words of the Funeral Service, all
divest the act of its squalor; and the spectator sympathises with, perhaps
almost envies, the comrade who has found this honourable exit.


But there was nothing dulce et decorum about the Dervish dead; nothing of
the dignity of unconquerable manhood; all was filthy corruption. Yet these
were as brave men as ever walked the earth. The conviction was borne in on me
that their claim beyond the grave in respect of a valiant death was not less
good than that which any of our countrymen could make. The thought may not be
original; it may happily be untrue; it seemed certainly most unwelcome.



Although 3,000 years separated him from the age of Achilles, Winston might
almost have been writing at Troy. But we are separated from the world of the Four
Feathers
by a vaster abyss. Osama Bin Laden might see himself, with minor
alterations of dress and armament, as the Madhi, but it is doubtful whether Ward
Churchill
could ever see himself as Winston. The gap was driven home to me
by the difference in tone between the Internet script
of the latest remake of Mason's novel and the original. It is widest at the
narrative's most crucial moment, when the protagonist confides his determination
to seek redemption by following his regiment into the Sudan. In the Schiffer-Amini
script redemption is a matter of regaining self-respect. In Mason's original, it
is altogether something else; something few Hollywood scriptwriters can easily
say today.












The Four
Feathers 2002
The Four
Feathers 1902
Col Sutch: [the protagonist's
father's best friend] (In disbelief): "...You're a civilian. Even
if you find them, there's nothing you can do."

Harry Feversham: "I'm well aware of my chances.


Col Sutch: Then what's the point!? (Staring at him in dismay) You
think Ethne will take you back? Is that what you think?!


Harry Feversham: I don't have any choice... (With a terrible honesty)
I'm not sure how much longer I can live with myself, here, like this...
I'm leaving for Egypt tomorrow.


Col Sutch: Do you want me to tell your father?


Harry Feversham: Only if something should happen to me. I'll write
and let you know how I am, as often as I can.


Col Sutch: What about Ethne?


Harry Feversham: I'd rather you didn't tell her anything. After all
I've put her through the least I can do is let her forget me in peace.

�There are endless
difficulties,� he said. �Just to cite one: I am a civilian, these
three are soldiers, surrounded by soldiers; so much the less opportunity
therefore for a civilian.�

�But it is not necessary that the three men should be themselves in
peril,� objected Sutch, �for you to convince them that the fault is
retrieved.�


�Oh, no. There may be other ways,� agreed Feversham. �The plan
came suddenly into my mind, indeed at the moment when Ethne bade me take
up the feathers, and added the fourth. I was on the point of tearing
them across when this way out of it sprang clearly up in my mind. But I
have thought it over since during these last weeks while I sat listening
to the bugles in the barrack-yard. And I am sure there is no other way.
But it is well worth trying. You see, if the three take back their
feathers,� -- he drew a deep breath, and in a very low voice, with his
eyes upon the table so that his face was hidden from Sutch, he added --
�why, then she perhaps might take hers back too.�


�Will she wait, do you think?� asked Sutch, and Harry raised his
head quickly.


�Oh, no,� he exclaimed, �I had no thought of that. She has not
even a suspicion of what I intend to do. Nor do I wish her to have one
until the intention is fulfilled. My thought was different�-- and he
began to speak with hesitation for the first time in the course of that
evening. �I find it difficult to tell you -- Ethne said something to
me the day before the feathers came -- something rather sacred. I think
that I will tell you, because what she said is just what sends me out
upon this errand. But for her words, I would very likely never have
thought of it. I find in them my motive and a great hope. They may seem
strange to you, Mr. Sutch, but I ask you to believe that they are very
real to me. She said --it was when she knew no more than that my
regiment was ordered to Egypt --she was blaming herself because I had
resigned my commission, for which there was no need, because -- and
these were her words -- because had I fallen, although she would have
felt lonely all her life, she would none the less have surely known that
she and I would see much of one another --afterwards.�


Feversham had spoken his words with difficulty, not looking at his
companion, and he continued with his eyes still averted:


�Do you understand? I have a hope that if -- this fault can be
repaired,� -- and he pointed to the feathers -- �we might still,
perhaps, see something of one another -- afterwards.�



And it was for the chance of 'afterwards' that he followed them into the
Sudan.

Selasa, 01 Februari 2005

The Insurgency Revisited


Dan
Darling
links to an analytic piece by Newsweek on the origins of the
Iraqi insurgency, some aspects of which resemble an old Belmont Club
post, which I have juxtaposed for comparison.  Here are some of the
similarities with the Newsweek
article.




















Unmasking the Insurgents
By Rod Nordland, Tom Masland and Christopher Dickey, Newsweek,
February 1, 2005
War
Plan Orange
, the Belmont Club October 25, 2004
A NEWSWEEK investigation shows
that long before U.S. and other Coalition troops blasted across the
border into Iraq on March 20, 2003, Saddam had put aside hundreds of
millions of dollars (some sources claim billions) and enormous weapons
caches to support a guerrilla war.
Faced with an invasion of Iraq
in 2003, Saddam carried out his own sideslip maneuver into a redoubt.
The Duelfer report notes that Saddam may have begun moving his WMD
materials into Syria as the US vainly attempted to get UN authorization
to topple his regime. ...

At least some of that was the key munition of modern terrorist
warfare -- money. ...


About 600,000 tons of munitions were dispersed throughout the country
of which 100,000 tons -- five Hiroshima bombs worth of explosive -- were
taken to Anbar province in the Sunni Triangle alone.

Those contacts and networks that Saddam's key cronies began developing months before the invasion now paid off. An understanding was found with the Islamic fanatics, and the well-funded Baathists appear to have made Syria a protected base of operations. Nor was there any shortage of
men to use these weapons. Former CPA Administrator Paul Bremer noted
that 100,000 convicted criminals were released just before US forces
overran the cities, ready to be officered, along with many Sunnis, by
either the cadre of the former Ba'athist dominated armies or
international terrorists flooding in from Iran and Syria.
"They were moving
aboveground before April 9 [2003], and they just moved underground
after," says Iraqi national-security adviser Mowaffaq al-Rubaie.

By July 2002, Saddam had distributed a circular to his top
leadership, warning that if and when the United States attacked,
"Iraq will be defeated militarily due to the imbalance in
forces," but could prevail by "dragging the U.S. military into
Iraqi cities, villages and the desert and resorting to resistance
tactics."

The major modern innovation of
the Arab Way of War has been its radical new conception of defense in
depth. The concept made its debut in Algeria; it was subsequently
refined in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Checnya and the West Bank. Unlike
Ushijima's Shuri Line with its tunnels in rock, the Arab redoubt was
founded on establishing an underground of terror in the civilian
populace. From the anonymity of crowds, they could emerge to attack the
enemy from the rear as the Imperial Japanese Army once had done from
tunnels. Faced with superior United States forces, this 21st century War
Plan Orange was the natural choice of the Arab strategists. By denying
the United States proof of its WMDs and grinding them down through
occupation warfare -- the one mode of combat at which they excelled,
they had a reasonable hope of holding America until a politician willing
to treat with them was elected into office.


One of the key things the Newsweek article misses but which War
Plan Orange
emphasizes was the role played by the delay caused by seeking
permission from the United Nations to topple Saddam. It is a factor given far
too little emphasis in retrospective analysis, although it did not escape Mark
Steyn, who wrote this Iraq
is going to be just fine.



The bulk of the military were already in place, sitting in the Kuwaiti
desert twiddling their thumbs. But Bush was prevailed upon to go ''the extra
mile'' at the United Nations mainly for the sake of Tony Blair, and thanks to
the machinations of Chirac, Schroeder and Co., the extra mile wound up being
the scenic route through six months of diplomatic gridlock while Washington
gamely auditioned any casus belli that might win the favor of the president of
Guinea's witch doctor. As we know, all that happened during that period was
that the hitherto fringe ''peace'' movement vastly expanded and annexed most
of the Democratic Party.



What made the 'insurgency' possible was the gift of time. Another important
factor was allowing enemy cadres to settle into their new clandestine positions
in the Iraqi northwest undisturbed. Newsweek correctly observes that the
core of the 'insurgency' -- which according to their own article is more or less
a fancy name for Saddam's henchmen, augmented by international terror -- was
struggling to get things together in the early days of the invasion, when they
were making the transition from aboveground to underground.



"During the initial period after the invasion, the Baath and its
security apparatus was in total disarray, and our security apparatus became
more focused on the terrorists and foreigners," said Barham Salih, the
Iraqi government's deputy prime minister, who is in overall charge of security
affairs. This, he said, was a miscalculation.



But Newsweek neglects to identify the key enabler of this maneuver:
the diplomatic veto, courtesy of America's allies at the UN,  which ensured
that the most powerful unit of OIF was absented from the battlefield in these
crucial early days, so that when it finally arrived, it was too late; and in any
event in the distant south, far from the Sunni areas it was originally scheduled
to assault through. The War Plan Orange post put it thus:



If MacArthur's delaying actions at the Agno and Pampanga Rivers enabled him
to get his forces into Bataan intact, the successful campaign to prevent the
US from pushing the 4ID down from Turkey gave Saddam the time and space to
move assets into Syria and disperse munitions and men into the Sunni Triangle.



One of the principle differences in the Newsweek analysis and the War
Plan Orange
post is in the interpretation of the strengths and weaknesses of
each side. Newsweek, for example, seems to regard the growing use of
untrained attackers as a sign of strength.



The typical profile is much like Ahmed al-Shayea's, twentysomethings and
even teenagers from comfortable middle-class families. "They have got no
experience, they are not trained," a Palestinian jihadi told NEWSWEEK.
"They just have to drive the vehicle. But these boys�17, 18 years old�are
important." What motivates them? "I think their religion is better
than others'," he says. "They are rich, they are educated, and they
need nothing, but they see that in this fight they will win either victory or
heaven. This is their ideology. Either way, they win."



The War Plan Orange post inferred that this was going to happen, but
saw it as a sign of weakness. It predicted that the differential attrition would
manifest itself in a growing experience and skill gap.



In essence, Ba'athist-terrorist coalition was unable to inflict the losses
necessary to disrupt the organizational learning curve of the American forces.
Unlike the conscript Soviet Army, the American Armed Forces were a
professional force that retained its core of officers, NCOs and to a large
degree, even their enlisted men. Forces were rotated out of Iraq largely
intact, where they incorporated lessons learned into the training cycle in
CONUS; and relieving forces were improved accordingly. In 1980s, the Al Qaeda
and not the Soviet Army had turned Afghanistan into a training ground but in
2003-2004, it was the US Armed Forces and not the terrorists that were coming
away with organizational memory. Simply not enough of the enemy survived to
pass on their experience and simply too many American lieutenants left Iraq to
return as captains. The terrible enemy losses on the battlefield could not be
wholly overcome by media plaudits which they received. At least 15,000 enemy
cadres have been killed in the 17 months since OIF. Recently, the remains of a
French jihadi were identified in Fallujah and his fate is probably a common
one. While Afghanistan was once where the young fundamentalist fighter went to
get experience, Iraq was now where the fundamentalist fighter went to die.



The 'fifteen thousand' figure was reached in October by back of the envelope
calculation and was my best guess from various sources at the time. It was off,
but thankfully not by much. Reuters
reported on Jan 26, 2005 that:



"If you look back over the last year we estimate we have killed or
captured about 15,000 people as part of this counter-insurgency," Casey,
the only four-star American general in Iraq, told reporters. "Just in
this month we have picked up around 60 key members of the Zarqawi network and
key members of the former regime," he said, referring to the group led by
al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.



But I think the main problem with the Newsweek analysis is that first,
it doesn't fully recognize the significance of the economy of force operation
against the Sunnis in April, 2004 as the US dealt with Sadr first in mid-year
before returning to crush the Sunni insurgent stronghold of Fallujah by
year-end. It was a classic example of using a small force to defeat a
numerically superior foe by attacking them in detail. I hope future historians
give it its due. Secondly, Newsweek almost ignores American political
warfare. The establishment of the Interim Governing Council and the Elections
had huge military implications from the start, something which is only being
belatedly recognized. The strategic center of gravity of the American thrust
into the Middle East was not Iraq the geographical entity, as so many have I
believe, mistakenly put it, but the Iraqis. The war aim was access to an
alliance with an unlimited pool of Arabic speakers, not a puddle of oil in the
ground. The return of Iraqi security and intelligence forces will be a nightmare
for regional dictators in the short term; but the advent of even a
quasi-democratic Iraqi state will, without exaggeration, be their death-knell.