Minggu, 20 Maret 2005

The New Belmont Club Site Is Up


It is sad to say goodbye to Blogger. The painfully slow response of the last
weeks has gone and it seems its old sprightly self again. If things don't work
out on the other site, there's always a home to come back to.


The Sitemeter was at 6,326,000 at the time of abandonment, which was a pretty good run.


The new Belmont Club site is at http://belmontclub.wretchard.com. Alternatively, you can use this url: http://www.wretchard.com/blogs/the_belmont_club/default.aspx

See you there!

Kamis, 17 Maret 2005

Let the spinnin' wheel spin


The two stories were related somehow, the nomination
of Paul D. Wolfowitz
for presidency of the World Bank and news that after 20
years of investigation the Canadian investigation into the bombing of an Air
India flight had come
up dry
. The question was how. Wolfowitz's nomination only makes sense if the
primary cause of world underdevelopment is perceived as political failure rather
than the mere lack of investment. Its narrative relationship to the Canadian
acquittal of the Air India bombing suspects is one of contrast: the failure of
the Crown prosecution to prove its case being cast in opposite terms; a lack of
technique rather than political failure.


The really shocking thing about the Canadian decision was illustrating how
two decades, $100 million in expenses and the best good will in the world could
get no further than establishing there was a bomb aboard the plane the night it
blew up. If the one air incident took that, what if, God forbid, some
really serious terrorist action happened in Canada that required a rapid
resolution? David Beatty's famous expression of disappointment at the
underperformance of his squadron at Jutland
captures the frustration perfectly. "There seems to be something wrong with
our bloody ships today."


The same thought has probably occurred to anyhow who has watched the World
Bank and other international development agencies flail their arms against the
tide of poverty. After spending hundreds of billions of dollars in the best ways
academia could conceive, five decades of development aid hasn't even established
whether the effort was useful. 'Never in the face of human effort has so little
been been accomplished by so much'.


But if insanity is expecting different results from the same actions then the
asylum is larger than it seems. The development bureaucrats are outraged that
Wolfowitz might try to do things differently.
Columbia's Jeffrey Sachs reacted to Wolfowitz's appointment saying "we need
someone with professional experience in helping people to escape from poverty.
Mr Wolfowitz does not have that track record". Neither, he might have
added, did anyone else. But that is nothing to the point.


The most damning charge against him was that he actually made something
happen. "Wolfowitz's nomination aroused particular concerns in Europe
because of his key role as an architect of the war in Iraq". Hence the
danger is that he might do it again. Far more reassuring in these latter days if
he had spent twenty years doing nothing at all. It has been long since Europe
remembered what once it knew so well.



Thro' the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day;

Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay.

-- Locksley
Hall


Let the spinnin' wheel spin


The two stories were related somehow, the nomination
of Paul D. Wolfowitz
for presidency of the World Bank and news that after 20
years of investigation the Canadian investigation into the bombing of an Air
India flight had come
up dry
. The question was how. Wolfowitz's nomination only makes sense if the
primary cause of world underdevelopment is perceived as political failure rather
than the mere lack of investment. Its narrative relationship to the Canadian
acquittal of the Air India bombing suspects is one of contrast: the failure of
the Crown prosecution to prove its case being cast in opposite terms; a lack of
technique rather than political failure.


The really shocking thing about the Canadian decision was illustrating how
two decades, $100 million in expenses and the best good will in the world could
get no further than establishing there was a bomb aboard the plane the night it
blew up. If the one air incident took that, what if, God forbid, some
really serious terrorist action happened in Canada that required a rapid
resolution? David Beatty's famous expression of disappointment at the
underperformance of his squadron at Jutland
captures the frustration perfectly. "There seems to be something wrong with
our bloody ships today."


The same thought has probably occurred to anyhow who has watched the World
Bank and other international development agencies flail their arms against the
tide of poverty. After spending hundreds of billions of dollars in the best ways
academia could conceive, five decades of development aid hasn't even established
whether the effort was useful. 'Never in the face of human effort has so little
been been accomplished by so much'.


But if insanity is expecting different results from the same actions then the
asylum is larger than it seems. The development bureaucrats are outraged that
Wolfowitz might try to do things differently.
Columbia's Jeffrey Sachs reacted to Wolfowitz's appointment saying "we need
someone with professional experience in helping people to escape from poverty.
Mr Wolfowitz does not have that track record". Neither, he might have
added, did anyone else. But that is nothing to the point.


The most damning charge against him was that he actually made something
happen. "Wolfowitz's nomination aroused particular concerns in Europe
because of his key role as an architect of the war in Iraq". Hence the
danger is that he might do it again. Far more reassuring in these latter days if
he had spent twenty years doing nothing at all. It has been long since Europe
remembered what once it knew so well.



Thro' the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day;

Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay.

-- Locksley
Hall


Selasa, 15 Maret 2005

Reply to Comments


I'm can't reply to comments due to the extremely slow performance of Blogger,
but the posting works a little better.



Baron
Bodissey
said...


The tactics the terrorists used -- the assault into the teargas, the fire
and smoke, the locking up of the other prisoners -- were they something
learned at jihad school, at the al-Qaeda camps, maybe? Or were they ad-hoc?



I don't know whether any of this is standard Jihadi doctrine. My guess
is they're ad hoc. Philippine prisons are some of the weirdest places on
earth. Greg Sheridan has an article in

National Interest
, the Jihad Archipelago, in which he makes these
revealing remarks about the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf and its principal ally,
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).



The Philippines is the strangest nation in Southeast Asia and the one with
the strongest  Islamic extremist movement. It is predominantly Catholic
(though with strong mystical influences) and more American than anywhere else
in the region. Hispanic in political culture, it is schizophrenic at many
levels of national identity.


The MILF is a very strange beast ... State Department officials would like
to list it as a terrorist  organization but don't because that would
torpedo the peace process, such as  it is. ... MILF-controlled areas of
the south provide both the training camps and  the vital rest and
recreation hinterland for the region's Islamist  terrorists, especially
JI operatives from Indonesia ... there is no doubt that they have 
provided, and continue to provide, training camps for JI terrorists. This 
allows JI to constantly replenish its stocks through new training programs ...


At the  same time, corrupt members of the Philippines armed forces
have aided the  MILF. ...  The papers described in shocking detail
the involvement of the Philippines  navy in dozens of incidents of
seaborne smuggling of military and other  supplies to the MILF.  A
smaller Islamist terrorist outfit, the Abu Sayyaf group, is ... much more
overtly linked to Al-Qaeda, and among its leaders  are veterans of the
Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The broader picture in the southern
Philippines is of the failure of the  state. Substantial Philippines
military operations, backed at times by  hundreds of U.S. troops in a
so-called "advisory" role, have made little  progress against either Abu
Sayyaf or the MILF. Until its military becomes  more effective, and
numerous other arms of the state can deliver the  services and order they
are supposed to, the prospect is for more of the  same. In many ways it
is the most disturbing piece in the Southeast Asian  jigsaw.



All of which you would have guessed from reading bits and pieces of the
Belmont Club
but Greg Sheridan puts it together in a respectable and
scholarly way. Philippines prisons are places where inmates devote nearly
limitless ingenuity to devising mind-boggling schemes. It's a place where
inmates implant plastic pellets in their Johnsons using razor blades,
merthiolate and ignorance; it's a place where inmates have passed messages to
each other using cockroaches tethered to thread; it's a place where people play
a game of 'attract the fly' by betting on which coin a fly will choose to light
upon in the toilets. It's a place where your life depends on your shiv and the
guys you've chosen as your friends. Poetry has been written and forgotten within
its walls. It is a place of closely held ritual, where by tradition all
prisoners beat their cups against the bars when a man is led to the electric
chair. It is as alien to the Philippine ruling elite as the surface of Mars.


I can imagine the Abu Sayyaf assaulting the police raiders in the teargas
clouds, running with that peculiar comedic gait characteristic of people
sprinting in flip-flops, lighting up the mattresses with a spluttering match
possessed with the indomitable spirit of Bahala Na (I don't give a damn) and
the cops shooting them down in the same part. One day, after the action has died
down in the Middle East, popular culture may turn its attention to the Second
Front against terror in Southeast Asia. Instead of the desert the images will be
of small boats flitting among islets under a whitening moon and of strange
chases in stinking cities between grotesques that would do justice to the
Army of Darkness
. Kipling would have been the writer of choice to capture
the atmosphere, only he is seventy years dead.

At the Big House


Readers who are curious will find a detailed account of the assault on the
Abu Sayyaf prisoner rioters here.
The picture that emerges is that of a police unit (SAF) that has reached a
respectable level of competence but may be a little rough at the edges.



plans had been drafted on how to assault the prison, outflank the superior
firing positions of the gunmen and surprise them. Apparently to weaken the
resolve of the enemy, SAF commander ordered all lights inside the jail
compound turned off and the V-150 armored personnel carrier driven around the
area. This was done every hour on the hour until daybreak yesterday. "We
wanted them to stay awake and keep them guessing whether we would attack or
not," said the SAF official.



Then there was the less than perfect entry strategy. "The SAF raiders
positioned themselves at both sides of the main gate of the Abu Sayyaf cell at
the ground floor and tried to pry open the lock. But they were met by sniper
fire each time they tried to insert the key into the lock." Marines in
Fallujah learned that it was worth one's life to spend an extended period of
time making a breach; that if a lock could not be knocked in with a couple of
blows, perhaps a breaching charge was in order.


To cover their entry, the SAF raiders flooded the darkened corridor with tear
gas, breached and entered. The resourceful Abu Sayyaf rushed forward in the murk
to grapple with the SAF, in the hopes of seizing more weapons. But the SAF had
been trained to work in pairs and the grapplers were repelled. To complicate
matters for the assault team, the Abu Sayyaf locked up regular prisoners in
adjacent cells and had piled up flammable materials which they set ablaze in the
corridors, so the flames and smoke would lay down a protective curtain. It was
in this confused, darkened and choking atmosphere that Commanders Kosovo, Robot
and Global conducted their last resistance. 'Kosovo' was apparently one of the
grapplers and shot a raider in the face before being gunned down. 'Global' died
in a fighting retreat to the third floor. How 'Robot' met his end is unknown.


The left-wing Philippine
Inquirer
, attempting to sound a note of seemingly sweet reason, says:



Their (the Abu Sayyaf ) deaths also mean that they have escaped trial and,
more importantly, put any information that they possessed irretrievably beyond
the government's reach. ... And the shrugging continued when other things were
pointed out, such as the dangers posed by having firearm-bearing guards in
close proximity to the Abu Sayyaf prisoners. ... Human rights activists, for
one, have been battling for years against overcrowding in our jails, which
puts underage offenders in close proximity to hardened criminals, and which
makes it even more difficult to properly isolate dangerous inmates such as
captured members of the Abu Sayyaf. ... The fact is that the Abu Sayyaf won
yet another round against the government. Its captured members died with guns
blazing, drawing the world's attention to their cause and their refusal to let
their detention circumscribe their actions.



For another view we must turn to Max
Soliven
.



When the gunsmoke � and tear gas � cleared, the most notorious
kidnappers-killers-and-bombers were dead: the bully Alhamzer Manatad Limbong,
alias Bro. "Kosovo" who had been identified by Gracia Burnham as one
of their cruel kidnappers, suspected of masterminding the SuperFerry 14
bombing which killed 110 helpless passengers, and triggered off the motorbike
"bomb" in Magutay, Zamboanga City, which killed US M/Sgt. Mark
Jackson, and seriously wounded US Capt. Mike Hummel in October 2002; Ghalib
Andang, alias Commander "Robot" who had led the gang which kidnapped
foreign tourists and Filipinos from the Malaysian tourist isle of Sipadan, and
raped women hostages repeatedly, humiliating the Estrada government for months
and collecting millions of dollars in ransom; and Nadzmi Sabdullah, alias
Commander "Global", the noisy spokesman of the Sipadan kidnap caper.
Also slain was ASG detainee Hasbi Dais alias Lando, who had conducted the
Monday "negotiations" and rejected all the government�s calls for
the group�s peaceful surrender.


Senin, 14 Maret 2005

The End of the Road


KM mails to say that the Philippine police have stormed the prison the Abu
Sayyaf  had taken over in a failed jailbreak.

Reuters
says seventeen prisoners died in the assault, crucially including
three of the top Abu Sayyaf honchos.



Philippine police have shot dead 17 prisoners as they stormed a jail in
Manila to end a day-long stand-off with a group of Islamic militants who had
snatched weapons from guards and killed three of them. ... Tear gas still
shrouded the building as television showed hundreds of prisoners milling
around on the top floor. Reyes said Alhamser Limbong, alias "Kosovo", Ghalib
Andang, alias "Commander Robot", and Najdmi Sabdula, alias "Commander Global",
were among the Abu Sayyaf leaders killed.



Although I can't prove it my own unfounded instinct says that the Philippine
cops have made sure the Peace Lobby and the human rights lawyers aren't going to
be taking these Abu Sayyaf commanders to any more press conferences. Of course,
since the three top Jihadis, experienced men all,  would have
wielded the three firearms known to have been seized from the guards and five
elite policemen were injured in the shootout, the cops can plausibly
argue they used proportionate force.

The Angel with the Fiery Sword


Remember how Philippine President Gloria Arroyo withdrew that nation's troops
from Iraq to effect the release of a Filipino hostage? Well she didn't retreat
far enough. Iraqi 'insurgents' have seized another hostage and Manila's
officialdom
has
expressed
'gratitude' for their delay in beheading him.



The Philippines Saturday lauded the recent extension granted by Iraqi
hostage-takers on the deadline by which they had threatened to kill a Filipino
hostage. The kidnappers of accountant Roberto Tarongoy had earlier said they
would kill him by March 11 but a Philippine team in Iraq had reported the
kidnappers had given an indefinite extension to the deadline Because of this,
Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio Bunye: declared, "We thank God for this
reprieve."



The 'insurgents' have presented a new demand. The hostage's father "has
appealed in a letter to Arroyo to 'heed the captors' demand' to free his son by
making a statement withdrawing support for US policy in Iraq." The statement of
repudiation may have to wait a while. Right now Philippine officialdom is busy
finding dinners for the Abu Sayyaf who took over a maximum security jail after
killing three guards.


How far does one have to retreat from evil to be truly safe? A letter writer
to Michael Totten
brought the inescapability of confronting evil home when he asked if Mr. Totten
would rule out torture if the safety of his own child depended on applying it.
Mr. Totten allowed it was a hard question; and yet the question was the right
one to ask. Any real opposition to torture would be unwavering even if it
involved sacrificing our own children. Volunteering those of others doesn't
count. Ivan Karamazov famously asked Alyosha whether he would accept the edifice
of Paradise if it were built upon the suffering of a single innocent child;
Alyosha replied that he would not. Yet there are any number who would maintain a 
principled opposition to war, torture or hostage payments at the expense of the
suffering of innocents. Did Saddam throw people into woodchippers? Regrettable
but better that than violate the principle of collective international action.
Are Blacks being massacred in Darfur? Sad, but unilateralism is worse. Surely
the price of maintaining the no-ransom policy isn't worth the life of a Filipino
hostage? Here the devil defeats the prospect of a free moral lunch. Not paying
ransom kills, but paying it kills too. Breese Bull of the

Washington Post
takes it personally whenever ransom (a.k.a. 'go buy an
IED') money is paid to 'insurgents'.



As a foreigner here, I feel threatened by the possibility that the Italian
government may have rewarded the kidnappers. But Iraq is not about us
foreigners. It is about Iraqis. And it is Iraqis who suffer most from
kidnappings and from the transportation of the artillery shells and anti-tank
mines that become roadside devices and car bombs. Kidnapping Iraqis has become
an almost routine business transaction here. ... But since the Sgrena
shooting, I've already sensed even greater reluctance to set up these
dangerous checkpoints.



A long time ago I personally came to the conclusion that there was no way to
live on earth without the stain of guilt, maybe the concept of Original Sin was
a rueful recognition of this condition. Yet there is perhaps the chance that one
may leave the earth forgiven. But that is another story.

Fallout Shelter


To Newsweek's
Paul
Tolme
, University of Colorado outgoing President Elizabeth Hoffman's
problems with Ward Churchill were all about preserving Free Speech in a nation
grown increasingly intolerant.



... earlier this year, ethnic-studies professor Ward Churchill ignited a
fierce debate over academic freedom because of a 2001 essay in which he called
victims of the September 11 attacks "little Eichmanns." Hoffman and many
members of the faculty defended Churchill's right to his opinions while
outside of campus, and Colorado lawmakers called for his dismissal. ...


Hoffman seemed particularly concerned about the Churchill situation. ...
"We are so deeply divided as a country." This division, she says, threatens
the foundation of liberal higher education. "The modern research university is
a big and complex place," she says, "but it ultimately is about the generation
of new ideas and the transfer of those new ideas to students. ... What's
tricky is sheltering new ideas without alienating the legislatures that
control state budgets.



Two ideas are striving for primacy in Hoffman's construct. The first is her
idea of the academy as a conservator of every specimen of mental life,
the counterpart of a biological repository containing bacterial and viral
samples; some virulent and some extremely beneficial. The second is the idea of
the academy as a transmitter of ideas. In her words, "the modern research
university is a big and complex place, but it ultimately is about the generation
of new ideas and the transfer of those new ideas to students."


Logically, the chief problem inherent in this duality is less about
'sheltering new ideas' from a public reluctant to support them than about
reconciling conservatory and scholarly functions with the pedagogical ones. Just
as modern medicine trains physicians to distinguish between poisons and
therapeutic drugs, the difference often being simply the size of the dose, the
modern university must above all train its students to discerningly choose from
the garden of concepts it so carefully cultivates, not simply engage in "the
transfer of those new ideas to students" as if they were so many hotdogs in a
cafeteria line.


Ironically, the public glare focused upon Ward Churchill's ideas in the
aftermath of his "little Eichmanns" essay provided the scholarly scrutiny that
the University of Coloardo itself neglected to supply. Did the US government
actually specify a 'blood quantum' for Native Americans? Did US troops really
distribute smallpox-impregnated blankets to tribes and with what precautions to
themselves? Did Professor Churchill really provide the content of books on which
his name appears or did he swipe it from some other scholar? Those are questions
which have been dissected at length by persons "outside the campus" and even by
"Colorado lawmakers". That they were not raised or even contemplated by academic
departments at the University of Colorado constitutes a failure of its most
basic mission. Universities not in the business of asking these these questions
are arguably not institutions of higher learning at all. That neglect, not the
discussion which her University went so far out of its way to avoid, "threatens
the foundation of liberal higher education".

The Carnival of Manila


Readers who think I exaggerate the incompetence of Manila should read veteran
Filipino columnist Max
Soliven
.



Throughout the day the nation had to listen to the demands of people who
had just killed three jail guards and were on trial for multiple murder and
kidnapping. They even found allies in the usual publicity-hungry politicians
and human rights advocates who were falling all over themselves to get into
the picture and sabotage police negotiations. And we wonder why the country is
turning into a terrorist paradise.



Not content with this summary disparagement, he added details in A
murderous jailbreak try that turned into a disgusting circus
. He describes
how the mayor of the jail site, the Congressman representing the district of the
jail site and a representative from the province the Abu Sayyaf suspects were born
in
began a bizzarre contest for the man best suited to represent their
"constituents". Then a renowned "human rights lawyer", who
had represented the Marcos family against US oppression showed up. Then things
really started to go downhill. A press conference got going.



The ring-leader, "Bro." "Kosovo" alias Alhamzer Limbong,
fat, muscular and bum-brawn* in aspect, was one of the cruelest captors of
Missionary Gracia Burnham and her slain husband Martin, the suspected beheader
of the other American "Dos Palmas" hostage, Guillermo Sobero, and is
the chief suspect in the SuperFerry 14 "bombing" which sent more
than 100 passengers in a fierce explosion to a watery grave. (*A local
colloquialism which means low-life punk -- W.)



Nothing better exemplifies the politicized, NGO-influenced and UN-guided
ideology of the Philippine ruling elite than this laughable performance. If the
characteristic of madness is that it goes unperceived by the most insane, then
Philippine officialdom qualifies. Soliven points out that the persons
responsible are likely to be promoted, in a country where no good deed goes
unpunished. The veteran columnist ends with an appeal to reason; much good may
it do him.



The last radio dispatch I listened to last night, before switching off, was
that the Abu Sayyaf hold-outs who were insisting on giving a "press
conference" (an opportunity sought with equal eagerness by our
"breaking news" hungry media) first asked to be served
"dinner" because they were already famished.


If there were not so much blood on the floor, the entire slaphappy affair
could have been described as a comedy. Yet we mustn�t forget these are
bloodthirsty, kidnapping, homicidal, false Islamic hoodlums we�re talking
about. They don�t deserve a hearing. What they deserve is a hanging.


Harum Scarum


The incapacity of the Philippine State was on display today as Abu
Sayyaf rebels
grabbed a guard's M-16 at a chowline in a maximum security
prison and used it to gun down three guards before taking over the whole
hoosegow. The Abu Sayyaf is a terrorist organization affiliated with Al Qaeda.
This simple hostage taking situation became an immensely complicated exercise
because it had to be resolved within the paralyzing and Byzantine political
world of Manila.



While lining up for breakfast rations at around 7 a.m., an unidentified
bandit grabbed the M16 rifle of his guard and opened fire, Colonel Agrimero
Cruz, Metro Manila police spokesman, said. 



The Abu Sayyaf prisoners held the political initiative from start to finish.
The BBC
reports:



The prisoners later contacted a local radio station, demanding talks with
two senior Muslim officials and film star Robin Padilla, a Muslim convert.
Police said they believed the prisoners were led by Alhamser Limbong and Kair
Abdul Gapar.



Among Alhamser Limbong's crimes were a mass kidnapping that included two
Americans and sinking a passenger ferry with a bomb, drowning more than 100
people. Beside Limbong Atlanta's Brian
Nichols
was a small-time crook. After several hours of negotiations, the following
agreement
was supposedly reached between the Philippine authorities and the 'rebels'.



"The surrender plan is now ongoing. The negotiation is still
ongoing," Senior Superintendent Leopoldo Bataoil told reporters. Bataoils
said the rebels would surrender "anytime from now."


The rebels' requests, which were approved by the government negotiating
team, include "no bodily harm" to the surrenderees, respect for
their human rights, speedy disposition of their cases, redress of their �grievances,�
and access to the media after their surrender.


"It's a win-win solution," Bataoil said.



By which he could only mean a win for the Abu Sayyaf and a win for the Abu
Sayyaf. As if this were not enough, the Abu Sayyaf  were granted legal
representation by lawyers of their choice. Having wrung these concessions the
Abu Sayyaf were prepared to lay down their arms -- still warm from the clutch of
the dead guards .


Ironically, the jail officials had been warned of an impending escape.
Naturally, it was ignored.



State prosecutor Leo Dacera said the authorities had intercepted a
telephone conversation between Alhamser Limbong, the alleged leader of the
prison revolt, and Abu Sayyaf leader Jainal Sali, who is at large, in which
the detainee "requested that eight safehouses be prepared."



Lynne Stewart was convicted of passing messages from her terrorist client to
his confederates at large. No wonder Stewart feels unfairly treated. In the
Philippines, men like Limbong can simply dial their associates and order them to
get safehouses ready so they can hole up after they escape. The Belmont Club
pointed
out
how restrictions imposed by the Philippine Left have severely hampered
the campaign against terrorism in that country. According to the Congressional
Research Service paper Terrorism in Southeast Asia (available from Gallerywatch.Com):



In consideration of the Filipino Constitution�s ban on foreign combat
troops operating inside the country, Washington and Manila negotiated special
rules of engagement ... U.S. Special Forces personnel took direction from
Filipino commanders and could use force only to defend themselves.



When US and the Philippine military had readied a campaign against the Abu
Sayyaf it was deep-sixed by the 'Peace Lobby'. The Terrorism in Southeast
Asia
paper continues:



In February 2003, Pentagon officials described a plan under which the
United States would commit 350 Special Operations Forces to Jolo to operate
with Filipino Army and Marine units down to the platoon level of 20-30 troops.
Another 400 support troops would be at Zamboanga on the Mindanao mainland.
Positioned offshore of Jolo would be a navy task force of 1,000 U.S. Marines
and 1,300 Navy personnel equipped with Cobra attack helicopters and Harrier
jets. ...


The announcement of the plan caused immediate controversy in the
Philippines. Filipino politicians and media organs criticized the plan as
violating the constitutional prohibition of foreign troops engaging in combat
on Philippine soil. Filipino Muslim leaders warned of a Muslim backlash on
Mindanao.



The paralyzing effects of Philippine politics were highlighted in the
handling of the prison hostage-taking crisis. Politics is what passes for the
exercise of Philippine sovereignty, which in practice is indistinguishable from
corruption and therefore creates a very high standard of patriotism among its
public figures. But for the average Filipino minimum-wage prison guards the
situation is subtly different. He knows he is guarding celebrities who
can attempt a jailbreak, constitute the panel to negotiate with if it goes
wrong, demand a direct response from the Philippine cabinet, get any legal aid
they want; who can kill their warders, extract a guarantee of nonreprisal and
give a national television press conference afterward. Little wonder that some
guards accept the money offered by these 'rebels' to let them go. That gold can
unlock a cell door was demonstrated in the manner in which Jema'ah Islamiyah
representative Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi escaped a Philippine jail in July, 2003.
It is described in detail by the Asia
Times
.



On July 14, the Indonesian Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) bomb expert, along with
two other inmates, members of the Abu Sayyaf bandit group, apparently unlocked
their cell with a set of spare keys, relocked it, walked out of the jail
building and through the prison gates, and used a small guardhouse to vault
over the compound wall. Of the four guards detailed in al-Ghozi's area, one
was sleeping; another was out shopping. Nevertheless, the guards managed to
register their hourly head count as complete. ...


Only when a new set of guards arrived five hours later was the escape
discovered; and only hours after that - allowing al-Ghozi a full half-day head
start - was the news reported to Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
She had just met with Australian Prime Minister John Howard to discuss joint
counter-terrorism initiatives.



But this craven behavior emboldened rather than weakened the Abu Sayyaf's
behavior. The surrender that was expected "anytime from now" waited
first upon a personal guarantee from the equivalent of the head of Philippine
Homeland Security. Then
"the deal appeared to collapse when the inmates demanded dinner before
ending the standoff." As of this writing the Abu Sayyaf are holding off the
entire Philippine Army with two rifles and pistol.

Minggu, 13 Maret 2005

Update on the New Site


First, I'd like to apologize for the inability of readers to reliable comment
on the posts. Because we all go through the Blogger interface, any difficulties
you may have experienced afflict me as well.


Here's the update on the new site. I've got a domain and a hosting service.
It will host more than a blog, though I'm not sure I'll activate all the
possible features because the administrative burden may spin out of control. The
weblog itself will be run on a product with a much greater feature set than
Blogger, but it will not be one which most will have heard of. The source code
for the entire application is distributed with it and that was the major
consideration in choosing it. However, it is one of these open source thingies
and there's no deluxe documentation, so it's taking a little time to figure
things out.


I finished getting something half decent up on my own web server -- that's been the focus of effort over the weekend -- but it's not behaving as expected on the hosting site. Something subtle. So I'll have to stay with Blogger for maybe a week more until the kinks get ironed out.

Jumat, 11 Maret 2005

A Tale of Two Worlds


Two articles paint radically different impressions of changes to United
States strategic thinking. The first, by Mark
Mazzetti of the Los Angeles Times
, depicts a military establishment
that has been hijacked by Operation Iraqi Freedom and the 'blunders' of
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.



With Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld pushing for a "lighter, more
lethal and highly mobile fighting force," the Pentagon scrapped as
outdated the requirement that the U.S. military be large enough to
simultaneously fight two large-scale wars against massed enemy armies. And it
spent little time worrying about how to keep the peace after the shooting
stopped. Something happened on the way to the wars of the future: The Pentagon
became bogged down in an old-fashioned, costly and drawn-out war of
occupation. ...



Mazzetti's article goes on to emphasize that while the smaller forces favored
by Donald Rumsfeld were sufficient to defeat a Third World conventional army
like Iraq's, the burdens of occupation have made the United States increasingly
dependent on allied help for pacification and nation building.



"There are smarter, more efficient ways to do regime change and occupation," said one senior civilian official at the Pentagon. "One of those ways is to rely much more on our friends and allies to do the back-end work."



The other article, by the Wall
Street Journal
(subscription only) describes a Donald Rumsfeld who not only
does not regret giving up the large forces of the Cold War but wants to
accelerate the process. It's most radical -- and possibly most controversial
aspect -- is the idea that the US military should increasingly be used to
prevent (here critics may see the word 'pre-empt') war from breaking out.



Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld outlines in a new, classified planning
document a vision for remaking the military to be far more engaged in heading
off threats prior to hostilities and serve a larger purpose of enhancing U.S.
influence around the world. ... In the document, Mr. Rumsfeld tells the
military to focus on four "core problems," none of them involving
traditional military confrontations. The services are told to develop forces
that can: build partnerships with failing states to defeat internal terrorist
threats; defend the homeland, including offensive strikes against terrorist
groups planning attacks; influence the choices of countries at a strategic
crossroads, such as China and Russia; and prevent the acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction by hostile states and terrorist groups.



The WSJ article goes on to say that Secretary Rumsfeld's 'big push' is
likely to meet opposition from certain quarters in the armed services because
these changes will come at the expense of weapons systems like the F-22 and
because they are a radical departure from many current missions.



... the classified guidance urges the military to come up with less
doctrinaire solutions that include sending in smaller teams of culturally
savvy soldiers to train and mentor indigenous forces. ... the Marines Corps
right now is moving fastest to fill this gap and is looking at shifting some
resources away from traditional amphibious-assault missions to new units
designed specifically to work with foreign forces . To support these troops, military officials are looking at everything from acquiring cheap aerial surveillance systems to flying gunships that can be used in messy urban fights to come to the aid of ground troops. 



Since the obvious danger to completely adopting this approach  is the
risk of reducing the US military to 'British Empire' troops, well suited for
fighting 'natives' but unable to match a first rate enemy, there is a second
track as well.



Although weapons systems designed to fight guerrillas tend to be fairly
cheap and low-tech, the review makes clear that to dissuade those countries
from trying to compete, the U.S. military must retain its dominance in key
high-tech areas, such as stealth technology, precision weaponry and manned and
unmanned surveillance systems.



If the outlines of the DOD planning document reported by the WSJ are
accurate, they are an explicit acknowledgement of the strategic dilemma faced by
the US in a post-Cold War world. During the Cold War, America only had to plan
on meeting the military challenges of Great States. The oceans provided a
barrier to threats from the Third World. For the first time in its history, the
United States (and Europe too, had they the honesty to realize it) faces a
two-front war, not spatially but dimensionally. At the one end, the DOD must
face continuous challenges from asymmetrical opponents harboring in the hulks of
failed, post-Colonial states. At the other, it must face conventional threats
from rising Great Powers like China. America's enemies on these separate fronts
will be naturally tempted to lend each other mutual aid. Terrorists can continue
to expect new weapons from States whose foreign policy goals call for weakening
America; and these rival States can expect those terrorist groups to tie down
America while they pursue their geopolitical ambitions. Just as America was the
Arsenal of Democracy in the Second World War, rival States have the potential to
become the Foundries of Terrorism in the 21st Century.


Rumsfeld's response appears to be shaped by this reality. It is a search for
systems, organizations and strategies which possess utility both against
terrorism and rival states. In some cases a match will be easy to find. In
others, most notably in the case of heavy divisions, manned aircraft and naval
systems, there must be a trade-off between them. But implied within Rumsfeld's
reported plan is the startling aspect of time: it is above all a
preemptive approach aimed at shaping the political and cultural battlefield in
advance of actual hostilities involving American troops. Although the concept is
described by the WSJ in the traditional terms of "helping allies
battle internal threats" it is impossible to separate it from the notion of
creating a more functional world, which is related to the ideas of reducing
disconnectedness
and spreading democracy. How and whether this concept
evolves into doctrine will be a fascinating process to watch. One suspects that
the ultimate price of the Western European vacation from history will have been
the transformation of the United States into the foremost revolutionary force of
the age.

Kamis, 10 Maret 2005

Forward or Back? 2


In

Forward or Back?
I wrote:



One wonders what the Syrians will do if the Lebanese opposition simply
refuses to cooperate with a new Karami government. It would then fall to the
Mukhabarat to break passive resistance.  ... One can imagine a scenario
where the opposition calls a protest boycott; maybe people get money not to
work.  ... To rule requires a lot more resources than to disrupt. Therein
lies the Syrian strategic weakness.



Events are still unfolding, but the noncooperation strategy is already being
laid down. Whether it will succeed or not remains to be seen. The

Financial Times
reports that although the 'Syrian-backed' Karami has made
conciliatory gestures, the opposition has so far rejected them.



"The difficulties we all know about cannot be confronted without a
government of national unity and salvation. We will extend our hand without
conditions and wait for the other side," he said. "I will not form a cabinet
of one colour (but if the situation deteriorates) I will hold the side that
does not participate in a national unity government responsible."


But Lebanon's opposition has already rejected the call, saying it was a
trap meant to neutralise it. Opposition figures say they will not participate
in any cabinet until their demands are met - this includes the formation of a
neutral government, the resignation of top security chiefs in Lebanon whom the
opposition holds responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri last month,
and the full withdrawal of all Syrian troops and intelligence agents before
the May parliamentary elections. The opposition has now called for another
demonstration on Monday, to mark one month after Hariri's assassination.



This defiant talk, coming against the background of low-level thugsterism
against opposition supporters amounts to a
call
("to place an amount of chips in the pot equal to the previous bet") on
Hezbollah's earlier implied threat of civil war. From published reports, it is
unclear whether Syria will raise or fold in response. According to the

New York Times
:



While in some corners of the country, Syrian soldiers could now be seen
moving, in other places there were few signs that troops were in a rush to
pack up. In Bois de Boulogne, a resort on a strategic hilltop linking Beirut
and the Bekaa region, Syrian soldiers could be seen peering from the balconies
in most of the fancy villas that line the main street. Russian-made transport
vehicles driving along the main Beirut-Damascus axis were empty. "No one is
gone here, and no one will ever leave," said Gabriel Germani, a property
developer from a nearby village.



In earlier posts, I advanced the nonspecialist opinion that Syria and
Hezbollah would be loathe to embark on a full scale civil war because they could
not forsee the consequences. That assessment was based on the appreciation that
Syria and Hezbollah were objectively weaker today than in 1975.

Powerline
rightly asks whether this assumption is valid. "Several readers
question Wretchard's statement that Hezbollah are far weaker now than in 1975.
They note that Hezbollah succeeded against Israel not that long ago." Fair
enough question. But it is worth noting that strength is always comparative. The
increase in American regional strength and the destruction of Saddam's regime
may not have weakened Syria and Hezbollah in absolute terms but it has
reduced them in relative terms. The transformative effect of Operation
Iraqi Freedom consists precisely in that it has upset the balance of power that
kept things in stasis; in that it has made groups like Hezbollah comparatively
weaker. It is in that change that democratic opportunities lie, and the Lebanese
opposition senses their moment.


Yet have Hezbollah and Syria been so weakened they dare not risk Civil War? 
While they might be reluctant to break the rack, they will do it in desperation.
This is reflected in their tactics. Karami's conciliatory gestures and the
ostensible pullback of Syrian troops show they would prefer it if people walked
quietly back into line. But the low-level intimidation and veiled threats are
meant to convey that if pressed, they can ultimately resort to brute force.
'Come along nicely or we'll turn Hezbollah loose' is the message of the past
week. If the Lebanese opposition makes good on their threat of nonparticipation
they will effectively be daring Syria to do its worst. And what would that be?
Provided that conventional forces are kept out of Lebanon, it would amount to an
attempt to maintain colonial rule via a militia and a secret service. I'll stop
my train of speculation right here and simply

repeat
"the observation that no country has ever been able to maintain
occupation over another using secret services alone."



Correction


Here's a correction from a reader. Told you I was a nonspecialist and my ignorance shows.




This has been driving me crazy since I read it earlier this afternoon.


Of course Hezbollah isn't weaker today. They didn't exist in '75. They
started their organization in the 80s.



http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/terror_report_orgs.html


Also known as Lebanese Hizballah, this group was formed in 1982 in response
to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, this Lebanon-based radical Shi�a group
takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the
teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.


The Times article mentions 1975 due to the long-standing civil war, not due
to Hezbollah's presence since then.


"It Never Existed"

According to the Telegraph, French authorities have airbrushed the cigarette out of John Paul Sarte's photograph.


France's
National Library has airbrushed Jean-Paul Sartre's trademark cigarette out of
a poster of the chain-smoking philosopher to avoid prosecution under an
anti-tobacco law. ...


The library's president, Jean-No�l Jeanneney, confirmed that the cigarette
had been discreetly smudged to comply with the 1991 loi Evin - a law banning
tobacco advertising - but also so as not to frighten away potential sponsors
from the exhibition, which opened yesterday.

The practice of historical revisionism, which was a central theme to George Orwell's 1984, was extensively practiced by Joseph Stalin. The target="_blank">NewsMuseum
documents the "before and after" photographs of Lenin with Leon Trotsky, among others, redacted from the image. But what if -- hypothetically now -- the NewsMuseum were in fact the forgery; what if Trotsky was digitally inserted into the picture. How would I know? 

target="_blank">Asymmetrical
Information
has a fascinating link to a book called the target="_blank">Motel
of the Mysteries
, a book constructed in the best archaeological literary style, describing a hypothetically complete misunderstanding of an entire civilization.


It is the year 4022; all of the ancient country of Usa has been buried
under many feet of detritus from a catastrophe that occurred back in 1985.
Imagine, then, the excitement that Howard Carson, an amateur archeologist at
best, experienced when in crossing the perimeter of an abandoned excavation
site he felt the ground give way beneath him and found himself at the bottom
of a shaft, which, judging from the DO NOT DISTURB sign hanging from an
archaic doorknob, was clearly the entrance to a still-sealed burial chamber.
Carson's incredible discoveries, including the remains of two bodies, one of
then on a ceremonial bed facing an altar that appeared to be a means of
communicating with the Gods and the other lying in a porcelain sarcophagus in
the Inner Chamber, permitted him to piece together the whole fabric of that
extraordinary civilization.



The elevation of a motel toilet to the central cult object of a vanished civilization is one possible consequence of unintended historical misunderstanding. But so powerful a technique as historical revisionism would tempt others to purposeful use, not only for the relatively harmless purpose of eliminating cigarettes from the likeness of Jean Paul Sarte, but for political gain. Certainly the machinery was in place to do this. An href="http://oxblog.blogspot.com/2005_03_06_oxblog_archive.html#111040362339
899733" target="_blank">Oxblog
link to target="_blank">Wikipedia
reminds us that the BBC's annual budget of $10 billion "rivals that of NASA. It is greater than the gross domestic product of more than half the world's nations and ranks behind the budgets of only the twelve governments of the wealthiest nations on the planet."


Who controls the past

Controls the future.

Who controls the present

Controls the past.



Has the Internet changed things all that much? Perhaps for most people born after today it will be a truism that Jean Paul Sarte didn't smoke; that Jean Paul Sarte never smoked.

Rabu, 09 Maret 2005

Forward or back?


The very large demonstrations in support of Syria sponsored by Hezbollah,
whether forced or not, can be interpreted as the end of the "Cedar Revolution".
There is certainly enough genuine nationalistic support for Syria within Syria
itself.

Syria Comment
(Joshua Landis) says:



Family members called me from Latakia to ask me what I though and to tell
me how proud they were and what a great man Nasrallah is. I was out doing
errands much of the day and all the shops had the TV on. Store owners and
errand boys alike were leaning over their counters watching the demonstration
with amazement and gratification. �This was the true Lebanon,� they insisted.
�People from every part and every religion,� they intoned, repeating the line
that the Lebanese opposition has been using for the last two weeks to insist
that it expresses the true Lebanon. �George Bush asked for democracy. This is
the true democracy," I was told repeatedly.


Today, Syrians will demonstrate. Many have told me they will go. The school
in which my wife teaches has closed for the day because it is in Mezze, the
section of town where the demonstration is to begin; the director fears that
the kids will not be able to get home because of the crowds. The UN offices
are only opening for half the day. It would seem that all of central Damascus
will be closing early today. This is the first demonstration of its kind that
most Syrians can remember and they are excited.



Having stemmed the tide and survived the scare pro-Syrian forces have moved
to reassert control. The

Associated Press
reports:



Lebanese legislators ignored the popular anti-government protests and
decided to re-install the pro-Syrian premier who was forced to step down last
week, a move ensuring Damascus' continued dominance but raising opposition
denunciation. ... Outgoing Prime Minister Omar Karami was virtually assured
nomination after 71 of 78 legislators put forward his name during
consultations with President Emile Lahoud, according to announcements by the
legislators as they left the presidential palace. ... The pro-Syrian
parliament members apparently were emboldened in their choice by a thundering
protest in Beirut the day before that showed loyalty to Syria, countering
weeks of anti-government and anti-Syrian demonstrations.



Some would dismiss

President Bush's call for a Syrian withdrawal by May
as mere posturing or
tilting at windmills.



President Bush demanded that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon before
parliamentary elections in May. ... "All Syrian military forces and
intelligence personnel must withdraw before the Lebanese elections for those
elections to be free and fair," he said. ... He said that freedom will prevail
in Lebanon and sided with anti-Syrian protesters in recent weeks, who have
demanded that Syria remove its 14,000 troops, following the February
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri. In what he
called a message to the Lebanese people, Mr. Bush said the world is witnessing
a great movement of conscience.



In fact,

Juan Cole
believes the whole thing is set to blow up in President Bush's
face, noting that anti-Syrian Jumblatt was recently anti-Wolfowitz.



The main exhibit for the relevance of Iraq to Lebanon is Druze warlord
Walid Jumblatt's statement to the Washington Post: "It's strange for me to say
it, but this process of change has started because of the American invasion of
Iraq. I was cynical about Iraq. But when I saw the Iraqi people voting, eight
million of them, it was the start of a new Arab world." It is highly unlikely
that Jumblatt is sincere in this statement. He has seen Lebanese vote for
parliament several times, and has campaigned, and Iraq was nothing new to his
experience (like Lebanon, it is occupied by a foreign military power even
during its elections).


I guess now that Jumblatt sees a way of getting the Syrians out of Lebanon
by allying with Bush, all of a sudden America is no longer an imperialist
cause of chaos. People who want to believe that remind me of PT Barnum's
dictum that one is born every minute.



Nor is he alone in that appreciation.

Richard Fairbanks
, a former U.S. negotiator for Middle East peace and
counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington
D.C. said:




"One, if it's seen as the West wants Syria out, that would not be helpful
to swaying the minds of the Shia and perhaps some others in Lebanon. Second,
these calls by the Europeans and Americans are not self-executing and there is
not another counterforce on the ground. So as much as the majority of the
people want this to happen it's not going to be so simple," he said. Political
analysts also argue that Middle East reforms have been announced in the past,
only to fizzle out before fundamental change took root.



My own nonspecialist opinion is that despite their apparent strength Syria is
holding a losing hand. The train of reasoning begins with the observation that
no country has ever been able to maintain occupation over another using secret
services alone. Secret services must ultimately operate behind a shield provided
by a secure border or conventional forces; otherwise their headquarters,
safehouses and files will be vulnerable to the first foe that shows up with a
tank. By sending those conventional forces back to the border while reinstalling
Karami, Syria is attempting to restore the status quo ante under weakened
circumstances. Can they do it?


One wonders what the Syrians will do if the Lebanese opposition simply
refuses to cooperate with a new Karami government. It would then fall to the
Mukhabarat to break passive resistance. With the Syrian Army moved back the
contest comes down to a secret service war where the party with the most money
usually wins. And if -- and even Juan Cole doesn't wholly deny this -- a
majority want Syria out, what would prevent the US from providing the money to
make it happen? One can imagine a scenario where the opposition calls a protest
boycott; maybe people get money not to work. It would be a sight to watch the
Mukhabarat collect garbage or force people to.To rule requires a lot more
resources than to disrupt. Therein lies the Syrian strategic weakness.


It isn't necessary and probably unwise to send conventional forces into
Lebanon to chase the Syrians out. It would be sufficient to gum the Mukhabarat
up; to run interference for the opposition and provide them with technical
support to achieve a decisive result because it is unlikely that Syria can
maintain control of Lebanon unless the Lebanese want them to, whatever
Juan Cole thinks. The problem with dictatorships is entropy; a lot of energy is
needed to keep people in line against their will and that task is frankly
impossible. So dictators cheat and create the illusion of omnipotence and a
climate of fear to hustle people along. Dictatorships depend, as Cole says
though he probably didn't mean it that way, on "PT Barnum's dictum that one is
born every minute". If the Syrian conventional troops are moved out of Lebanon,
its hold will depend utterly on smoke and mirrors.

"When you call me that, smile!"


From the newsrooms.


The Toronto Star: Bush
demands Syria quit Lebanon by May



George W. Bush, saying the time for delaying tactics and half-measures has
passed, has set a May deadline for Syria's full withdrawal from Lebanon. ...
"Today, I have a message for the people of Lebanon," Bush said.
"All the world is witnessing your great movement of conscience.
"Lebanon's future belongs in your hands, and by your courage, Lebanon's
future will be in your hands. The American people are on your side."



Reuters: IRA
"must go" after N.Irish shooting offer



The United States has demanded the IRA disband after the paramilitary
group's astonishing offer to shoot the killers of a murdered Northern Ireland
Catholic man. "It's time for the IRA to go out of business," said
U.S. special envoy Mitchell Reiss on Wednesday. ... Reiss told BBC radio:
"It's time for Sinn Fein to be able to say explicitly, without ambiguity,
without ambivalence, that criminality will not be tolerated."



The Boston
Globe
:



Five sisters who have waged a rare public campaign against intimidation by
the Irish Republican Army following the killing of their brother have been
invited to the White House on St. Patrick's Day, the US envoy to Northern
Ireland said yesterday. ... One of the slain man's sisters, Catherine
McCartney, said she hoped President Bush could help bring his killers to
justice. ''The case we'll put to Bush will be the same as it has been to
everybody here in Ireland: that these men must be brought to justice, and he
should use whatever influence he has to make that happen," she said.



The problem with trying to reconstruct events from historical records is that words taken by themselves convey a very partial meaning.
A future historian might argue that Kofi Annan could
have imparted the very same message of encouragement to the Lebanese people in
far better style than George Bush. But would it have possessed the same semantic
charge? Many a British politician has exhorted the IRA to
close down with the complete force of logic behind them and the powers of
unsurpassable rhetoric at their service -- and yet would they have the
significance of the US special envoy's ultimatum? On the many occasions when victims of injustice have been
invited by dignitaries for symbolic consolation, very few have at one and the
same time managed to convey a veiled threat. 


It would be
a bold counselor who would advise President Assad to relax. Nor
would it occur to Gerry Adams to jokingly inquire whether the words
"explicitly, without ambiguity, without ambivalence" mean definitely.
Jokes are something you make to the French. Things have got to be real simple for the
Chimp. Or maybe the problem is that they have gotten too complicated for the
sophisticates of the world when they should have been simple to start with.
Historians know that beyond mere words there is context and it is to sentences what a fist is to a
boxing glove. Maybe that's what Teddy Roosevelt meant when he said, "speak
softly and carry a big stick".

Selasa, 08 Maret 2005

High Noon


Hezbollah's leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah

came out openly in support
for the Syrian-Lebanese special relationship -- a
code word for the occupation of Lebanon -- at a well organized mass rally
designed to counter the "Cedar Revolution" protests against Syrian occupation.
He attempted to redefine the current Middle Eastern crisis, not as a contest
between democratic aspirations and autocratic "Black
Arabism
" but as a struggle against 'US-Zionist' neocolonialism.



Banners held aloft read: "No to American-Zionist intervention. Yes to
Lebanese-Syrian brotherhood." "Forget about your dreams of Lebanon," Sheik
Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, said at Tuesday's rally, speaking to Israel's
leaders. ... "What you did not win in war, I swear, you will not win with
politics." Speaking to the Bush administration, he said: "You are wrong in
your calculations in Lebanon. Lebanon will not be divided. Lebanon is not
Somalia; Lebanon is not Ukraine; Lebanon is not Georgia."





ABC News
implies that Nasrallah's decision represents a failure by
anti-Syrian politicians to keep Hezbollah neutral.



Hezbollah, an anti-Israeli party representing Shiite Muslims, organized the
rally as a way of demonstrating that it will remain a powerful force in
Lebanon even if Syria leaves. The Lebanese opposition, which opposes Syria's
presence, has been trying to persuade Hezbollah to remain neutral in the
country's political crisis.



Austin
Bay
wonders if Syria -- via Hezbollah -- is willing to precipitate a new
civil war if that will prevent its expulsion from Lebanon. "Will it become a
shooting civil war? It already has, if those reports of �pro-Syrian gunfire� in
East Beirut are true." On the other hand, there are those who don't think
Syria is ready to mix it up. The

New York Times
quoted opposition politicians who felt that Hezbollah's
support for Syria represented weakness rather than genuine strength.



"This is a goodbye party, not a show of support for Syria," said the
opposition leader Jibran Tuweini, editor of the Lebanese daily An Nahar. "If
they wanted this to be a challenge to us, they would have brought their
party's yellow flags. But Hezbollah doesn't want to burn its bridges with
anyone because ultimately they will have to return to the Lebanese people once
everything is over."



The Lebanese-watching blog

Across the Bay
also sees the Hezbollah demonstration as a sign of weakness.
Here is their reasoning.



There is little doubt that a majority of Lebanese--Christians, Druze, Sunni
Muslims (particularly after the assassination of Rafik Hariri), and not a few
Shiites (how I recall that the most violent postwar confrontations with Syria
occurred between Syrian soldiers and Shiite soccer fans after matches in which
Syrian and Lebanese teams competed)--want an end to Syrian domination. Today,
the truth is clear: Hezbollah seeks to become the Praetorian Guard of a
Syrian-dominated order in Lebanon for after Syrian soldiers withdraw. In that
context, the killing of Hariri also becomes clearer: it was preparation for
what Damascus understood would be an inevitable Syrian pullout, ensuring that
a strong Sunni, with a national project for Lebanon (who could also have
threatened the stability of the Alawite regime in Damascus), would be
eliminated.
The flip side of that strategy is giving Hezbollah ever more power
in a post-Syrian-withdrawal Lebanese state. (Italics mine)




Can such a plan work? I rather doubt it, given the anger of Syria's
Lebanese adversaries and international wariness, but unless Hezbollah refuses
to get further sucked into such a project, it will both lose its national
credibility and might carry Lebanon into a period of prolonged crisis as the
party tries to protect its gains. On top of this, fears in Riyadh, Amman and
Cairo of a so-called "Shiite crescent" stretching from Iran and Iraq to
Lebanon (via Syria and its support for Shiite Lebanese power), will make the
Sunni Arab states redouble their efforts to undermine the regime of Syrian
President Bashar Assad. If that happens, where will Hezbollah be? Ultimately,
the party's destiny is within Lebanon, not forever tied to the interests of
Iran or Syria.



My own nonspecialist thinking on the matter is as follows. On the one hand,
Syria would be anxious to shift the ground away from 'Cedar Revolution' events
back toward "Hama rules", an area in which they excel.

Across the Bay
suggests that despite the huge numbers of persons attending
the Hezbollah rally it had the air of contrivance and coercion. The democracy is
one game Damascus does not play well, in contrast to car bombing, at which they
are virtuosos.



Tomorrow, and on the eve of the �glorious� event that brought the Baath
Party to power in 1963, more such recruits will gather in al-Jalaa Stadium to
perform another sycophant song and dance about national honor and pride (a
similar demonstration organized by Hizbollah will take place in Beirut). But
the truth is, and the people know it, Baath rule brought nothing but shame and
humiliation. It destroyed the very moral and civil fabric of our fledgling
republic.


And the people know it. And the people know it. That�s exactly the problem.
The people know it. This is not the time of ignorance anymore. We know. We are
informed. We may not the whole truth about what is happening all around in us,
but we really don�t need to. We just know enough not to be fooled by empty
promises and gestures. We know enough to distinguish between victory and
defeat, between a show of principles and a freak show.



So why not steer Lebanon back into civil war? I strongly suspect that while Hezbollah is prepared to
threaten civil war, they are far less anxious to actually start it. It is
true that the
resurgence of sectarian fighting is widely feared and Hezbollah will play to
that apprehension. As the

New York Times
writes:



Fears that the growing political tension will lead to a resurgence of
violence have grown in recent days as Lebanon's political and sectarian fault
lines have re-emerged. Lebanon's rival groups fought a vicious civil war from
1975 to 1990, leaving parts of the country in ruins.  "This is a delicate
situation but not a dangerous one," Mr. Tuweini, the opposition leader,
insisted as he watched the demonstration on television from his office
overlooking Martyrs' Square. "I'm not worried about the unity of the Lebanese,
but I am worried that car bombs and assassinations will happen as we try to
defend it."



Yet the fear of a civil war must extend to Hezbollah and Syria themselves
because they are objectively far weaker in 2005 than they were in 1975.
There is no guarantee that Syria and Hezbollah would emerge victorious from a
full-scale civil war and every probability they would lose it, so why start
something in which you are bound to be beaten? To use a
cinematic metaphor, although Nasrallah has strolled all the way down Main Street
and struck a pose, he hasn't made a move for his gun. Time was he would have
cleared leather; what's different is this time is he's not so sure he's the
fastest draw in town. My own instinct is that unless a series of unfortunate
incidents throws things out of control, no one will be particularly anxious to
start fighting. Syria may have made a fundamental miscalculation in playing the
Hezbollah card because it puts Damascus' future in Lebanon in Nasrallah's hands.
One wonders if the older Assad would have done this. If
-- and I have no idea how -- Hezbollah can be convinced to double-cross Syria by
showing them that direction has no future, Boy Assad will be up the creek
without a paddle. What do you mean we kemo sabe?

The New Belmont Club


A number of readers have complained about the execrable posting response of
Blogger. There's nothing I can do about Blogger, which may be a victim of its
own success, as it tries to serve a very large community of users. I thought I'd
let the readers know that I am building a new site on a different domain. With
any luck, it will be much more capable than the current site. That's all I'd
like to say for now until I get it all up and running.

Senin, 07 Maret 2005

Energy Futures


In one scenario, which the media and the United Nations say is just
within reach
, the world in 2050 will be producing smaller amounts of
'Greenhouse gases' as nations reduce their fossil fuels consumption.



French President Jacques Chirac called on Tuesday for developed countries
to cut gas emissions to a quarter of current levels by 2050 -- exceeding
targets set by the Kyoto pact to combat global warming. ... "We must go
further -- divide by four by 2050 the greenhouse gas emissions of developed
countries. The next G8 summit must be an opportunity for advancing in this
direction," Chirac told a working group, according to the Elysee
presidential palace.



But the investment dollars and great states are decisively betting the exact
opposite will happen. A Congressional Research Service Report Rising Energy
Competition and Energy Security in Northeast Asia
(available from Gallerywatch.Com
shows that world consumption of petroleum will increase dramatically, driven by
economic growth in North America and Asia Pacific. The projected US consumption
for petroleum will grow from 24 in 2001 to 34 million barrels per day in 2020.
In that period, Asian consumption will grow to equal that of the United States
and will be poised to exceed it.



Although China still depends on coal to meet nearly 65% of its energy
consumption, it surpassed Japan in 2003 to become the world�s second largest
oil consuming country after the United States. ... If China reaches per capita
consumption levels comparable to South Korea, its demand will be twice that of
the United States and push up the worldwide demand for oil by at least 20%.
(CRS 8)



This gigantic appetite for petroleum has had two immediate effects. It has
made China dependent on ever-increasing quantities Middle Eastern oil and turned
it into rival of Japan, and to a lesser extent the United States, for new
sources of oil and gas. Over the same period European petroleum consumption is
projected to remain unchanged, largely as a consequence of flat growth, a
bystander to this unfolding drama. The two great Asian nation's need for oil has
embroiled them in a rivalry for the reserves in Russian Siberia.



Although the Russian Far East�s promise is significant, many strategists
have cast doubt on the commercial viability of tapping the Far East�s
reserves. This has not discouraged China and Japan from engaging in a bidding
war over Russian projects to bolster their energy security. ... The opening
round of the contest centers around negotiations on proposed pipeline routes
from the eastern Siberian oilfield of Angarsk. Beijing reportedly wants the
pipeline to terminate at Daqing, China�s flagship oilfield with refining
facilities in the industrial northeast, while Tokyo is lobbying for it to
terminate in the Russian port of Nakhodka, near Vladivostok on the Sea of
Japan and a short tanker trip away from Japan. (CRS 11)



The Sino-Japanese competition has all the hallmarks of a ding-dong NBA final
going down to the wire.



An agreement between Russia and China, endorsed by both President Putin and
President Hu, stalled, however, after the arrest of Russian oil tycoon Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, chairman of Yukos, the company that had been selected to
construct the pipeline. ... Although Beijing reportedly thought it had secured
the deal, the most recent reports have indicated that Putin is leaning toward
the Nakhodka option because of Japan�s generous pledge of infrastructure
development assistance. (CRS 11)



To make matters more interesting, Russia has to contend with another great
power in southern Central Asia -- the United States.



China�s thirst for oil has led to new partnerships with Central Asian
states, an area of traditional rivalry between great powers. Moscow is
challenged by Beijing�s inroads with members of the former Soviet empire,
and both continental powers are aware of expanded American presence with the
establishment of U.S. bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The
three powers will likely remain very attentive to the sensitive issue of
pipeline construction. (CRS 17)



Yet even the great reserves of Central Asia will be unlikely to satisfy the
gargantuan demands of China. Between 2001 and 2020, Siberian oil field
production is predicted to rise from 8 to 15 million barrels per day. In that
period, Middle Eastern oil field output will climb from 22 to 36 million barrels
per day and every drop of that will be required to meet the projected demand.
(CRS 2). China, once capable of isolating itself from the world, will become
dependent for its economic existence on oilfields in the distant Middle East and
the ability to transport the fuel to its factories.



In March 2004, Saudi Arabia announced that, in a bid for stronger ties with
China and Russia, it had granted contracts to oil companies from those
countries to explore for natural gas reserves in the kingdom after talks with
American firms collapsed. Some scholars have posited that Asian nations�
competition for energy supplies with the West could lead to an eventual Middle
East-Asia nexus, in which Asian governments become more politically close with
the Gulf states in order to secure long-term access, thereby marginalizing
U.S. power. Other observers have envisioned dire scenarios that could emerge
from a protracted U.S.-China struggle over oil, including an increasingly
close China-Saudi Arabia relationship that could lay the groundwork for a
world war-level conflict. (CRS 18)



Still others see China growing closer to the United States due to a
commonality of interests. As the procession of tankers leaving the Persian Gulf
bound for Chinese ports grows, the one nation that could instantly shut of the
supply through maritime blockade would be the United States. A risk-averse China
might see it in its interest to cooperate with Japan and the United States to
create a stable and prosperous Middle East, essentially duplicating Japanese
policy.



Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba was recently quoted as saying, �To have
other countries...do all the unpleasant, hard things, while we take the oil
after Iraq becomes affluent and peaceful through the painful efforts of the
rest of the world, I don�t think that would be acceptable.� Prime Minister
Koizumi has asserted that stability in the Middle East is in Japan�s
national interest because of its dependence on the region�s oil. ...
Japan�s unprecedented deployment of Self Defense Forces to Iraq, as well as
its active encouragement of Southeast Asian nations to join the U.S.- led
Proliferation Security Initiative, may be indications of this trend.



However that may be, the CRS report paints a picture of a world far, far
different from that envisioned by the Kyoto Protocol: one in which a senescent
Europe of uncertain composition dreams under the protection of the Pacific hemisphere.
Which comes
to pass depends on many things that cannot be foreseen, such as unanticipated
technological breakthroughs and on the statecraft of the next two decades.

Minggu, 06 Maret 2005

Hormuz


Austin
Bay
discusses the possibility that Iran might close the Straits of Hormuz in
response to US and European sanctions to prevent Teheran from obtaining nuclear
weapons. The Iranians didn't actually threaten anything but simply warned of
an "oil crisis" in the event they were pushed to the wall.

ABC News Online
says:



Iran's top nuclear official has warned the United States and Europe of the
danger of an oil crisis if Tehran is sent before the United Nations Security
Council over its nuclear program. ... "The first to suffer will be Europe and
the United States themselves, this would cause problems for the regional
energy market, for the European economy and even more so for the United
States," he said.



The Iranians were at pains to distinguish between a 'reasonable' Europe and
an intransigent United States. Teheran pointedly implied that if the whole
region were destabilized the fault would lie squarely with the United States.



Mr Rowhani, who was speaking at a conference in Tehran on nuclear
technology and sustainable development, however expressed optimism that an
agreement would be reached with Europe over the development of Iran's nuclear
program. ...  Mr Rowhani warned the US that it could destabilise the
region if it blocks an accord with Europe. If Washington brings the issue
before the Security Council, "Iran will retract all the decisions it has made
and the confidence-building measures it has taken", he said.



Actual speculation that Iran was threatening naval action was from the
Persian
Journal
, which reported ominous statements from a senior member of the
Iranian government.



"An attack on Iran will be tantamount to endangering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
and "in a word" the entire Middle East oil," Iranian Expediency Council
secretary Mohsen Rezai said on Tuesday. About 40 percent of the world's crude
oil shipments passes through the two-mile wide channel of the strategic
Straits of Hormuz. ... Teheran could easily block the Straits of Hormuz and
use its missiles to strike tankers and GCC oil facilities.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that
oil tanker traffic through the Straits of Hormuz will rise to about 60 percent
of global oil exports by 2025.
Rezai, a former commander of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps ... said such a significant increase in oil prices
would also be sparked by international sanctions on Tehran.



The Iranians could blockade the Gulf, but for how long is the question. (DIA) Director Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby

testified last month
that



"Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy
using predominantly naval, air and some ground forces. Last year it purchased
North Korean torpedo and missle-armed fast attack craft and midget submarines,
making margin improvements to this capability."



The threat seems serious because he strait is only two miles
wide in places. The
World
Tribune Com
claims that "Teheran could easily block the Straits of Hormuz
and use its missiles to strike tankers and GCC oil facilities, according to the
new edition of

Geostrategy-Direct.com
. Within weeks, the rest of the world would be
starving for oil and the global economy could be in danger." In fact, a blockade
of the Persian Gulf has been attempted before -- by Iraq -- but went largely
underreported in the pre-Internet days during the
Tanker War of
1984-1987
.



In 1981 Baghdad had attacked Iranian ports and oil complexes as well as
neutral tankers and ships sailing to and from Iran; in 1984 Iraq expanded the
socalled tanker war by using French Super-Etendard combat aircraft armed with
Exocet missiles. Neutral merchant ships became favorite targets, and the
long-range Super-Etendards flew sorties farther south. Seventy-one merchant
ships were attacked in 1984 alone, compared with forty-eight in the first
three years of the war. Iraq's motives in increasing the tempo included a
desire to break the stalemate, presumably by cutting off Iran's oil exports
and by thus forcing Tehran to the negotiating table. Repeated Iraqi efforts
failed to put Iran's main oil exporting terminal at Khark Island out of
commission, however. Iran retaliated by attacking first a Kuwaiti oil tanker
near Bahrain on May 13 and then a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters five days
later, making it clear that if Iraq continued to interfere with Iran's
shipping, no Gulf state would be safe. These sustained attacks cut Iranian oil
exports in half, reduced shipping in the Gulf by 25 percent, led Lloyd's of
London to increase its insurance rates on tankers, and slowed Gulf oil
supplies to the rest of the world ...



As the Tanker War spread to attacks on all shipping, the tankers were convoyed in
and out the Gulf by naval vessels, resulting in one action where the FFG-7 class
USS Stark was nearly sunk by a French built Exocet missile fired by an Iraqi
warplane. Iran did not attack US naval vessels at the outset.



Iran refrained from attacking the United States naval force directly, but
it used various forms of harassment, including mines, hit-and-run attacks by
small patrol boats, and periodic stop-and-search operations. On several
occasions, Tehran fired its Chinese-made Silkworm missiles on Kuwait from Al
Faw Peninsula. When Iranian forces hit the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City in
October 1987, Washington retaliated by destroying an oil platform in the
Rostam field and by using the United States Navy's Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL)
commandos to blow up a second one nearby.


Within a few weeks of the Stark incident, Iraq resumed its raids on tankers
but moved its attacks farther south, near the Strait of Hormuz. Washington
played a central role in framing UN Security Council Resolution 598 on the
Gulf war, passed unanimously on July 20; Western attempts to isolate Iran were
frustrated, however, when Tehran rejected the resolution because it did not
meet its requirement that Iraq should be punished for initiating the conflict.


In early 1988, the Gulf was a crowded theater of operations. At least ten
Western navies and eight regional navies were patrolling the area, the site of
weekly incidents in which merchant vessels were crippled. The Arab Ship Repair
Yard in Bahrain and its counterpart in Dubayy, United Arab Emirates (UAE),
were unable to keep up with the repairs needed by the ships damaged in these
attacks.



Parallels with the earlier Tanker War are bound to be inexact. Most naval attacks were by Saddam Hussein's forces in the Northern
Persian Gulf, where the waters are wider. Iraq did not enjoy Iran's geographical
advantage of actual positions at the chokepoint. But the Iranians demonstrated the ability to
fire missiles from land batteries at maritime targets owing to the extreme
narrowness of the Straits and to mine it. Another FFG-7 class warship, the
USS Samuel B. Roberts
was seriously damaged when it struck an Iranian mine in April, 1988 and was so heavily damaged it had to be shipped home by
heavy lift for a year's repair at Bath Iron Works.



Three days after the mine blast, forces of the Joint Task Force Middle East
executed the American response - Operation Praying Manits. During a two-day
period, the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air Force units of Joint Task Force
Middle East destroyed two oil platforms being used by Iran to coordinate
attacks on merchant shipping, sank or destroyed three Iranian warships and
neutralized at least six Iranian speedboats.



But the bottom line is that an Iranian blockade of the Gulf of Hormuz will
probably fail to stop tanker traffic completely, just as it failed in the 1980s.
US forces in the region have grown comparatively more capable, with facilities
within the Gulf itself, both in Bahrain and in Iraq, for example. An Iranian
blockade would however, disrupt tanker sailings, increase insurance premiums and
generally drive the cost of crude upwards; it might even sink a number of
tankers and naval vessels, but in the end the United States would prevail.
Strangely enough, the Iran blockade threat is more powerful "in being" than in
actual implementation. While it remains simply a threat, it can be used as a
diplomatic lever to extract concessions. If actually carried out, Europe
and China, whatever their political inclinations, would be forced by economic
necessity to help break the blockade.